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ABSTRACT
 Employees who engage in protected concerted activities re-
lating to work generally are shielded from discipline by Section 7 
of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA). Where otherwise 
protected work-related activity involves profanity or offensive speech 
or actions, whether in or out of the workplace, on a picket line, or 
on social media, such may violate employer civility rules and/or 
equal employment opportunity laws. Important interests are at 
stake, including for employers to maintain a safe, discrimination-
free workplace; and for employees to exercise their right to com-
municate about workplace matters. This Article analyzes recent 
cases on the question when offensive employee conduct loses NLRA 
protection, highlighting the National Labor Relations Board’s 
reconsideration and revision of its standards in the General Motors 
case, July 2020. The Article analyzes the prior context-dependent 
tests applied by the NLRB to assess whether an employee should 
lose the protection of the Act, finding these tests more than ade-
quate to balance the important public policies underlying both 
the NLRA and equal employment opportunity laws, as well as 
employer and employee rights to manage and work in a place 
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with a desired level of consideration for others. The Article con-
cludes that the Board’s new application of the forty-year-old 
Wright Line standard to these cases increases management rights 
and latitude at the expense of hindering employee rights to gather 
together to discuss and object to problems in the workplace. 
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INTRODUCTION
 This Article outlines the current state of the law regarding 
conduct that, while otherwise protected by Section 7 of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act,1 nonetheless involves workplace pro-
fanity or offensive speech, in person, online, or on a picket line, 
that potentially violates employer civility rules and equal employ-
ment opportunity laws. The Article considers recent cases on this 
important issue, highlighting the National Labor Relations Board’s 
own reconsideration of its standards as announced in its call for 
amicus briefs in the General Motors2 case, September 2019, and the 
NLRB’s 2020 resolution of the GM case.3 The author recommends a 
solution that balances the important public policies underlying 
both the NLRA and equal employment laws, and employer and 
employee rights to manage and work in a place with the desired 
level of consideration for others, whether in or out of the work-
place and on social media.4
1 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2018). Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act (the 
Act) guarantees employees  
‘the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organ-
izations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their 
own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the 
purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection,’ 
[as well as the right] to refrain from any or all such activities.  
Interfering with employee rights (Section 7 & 8(a)(1)), NLRB, https://www 
.nlrb.gov/rights-we-protect/whats-law/employers/interfering-employee-rights  
-section-7-8a1 [https://perma.cc/C34P-5K6B]. These rights apply to employees 
in the private sector whether they are unionized or not. See Employee Rights,
NLRB, https://www.nlrb.gov/about-nlrb/rights-we-protect/your-rights/employee 
-rights [https://perma.cc/4M6B-E3LM]. All employees have rights to engage 
in concerted activities with co-workers regarding discussion of wages, hours 
and working conditions, as well as concerted activities for mutual aid or pro-
tection. See Protected Concerted Activity, NLRB, https://www.nlrb.gov/about-nlrb 
/rights-we-protect/our-enforcement-activity/protected-concerted-activity [https:// 
perma.cc/JB8B-5AXY]. This includes protection from unfair labor practices, 
unjust discipline, and so forth. See Interfering with employee rights (Section 7 
& 8(a)(1)), supra.
2 Gen. Motors LLC (Gen. Motors II), 368 N.L.R.B. No. 68, slip op. at 2–3 
(Sept. 5, 2019) (3–1 decision) (throughout this Article, NLRB and Board are 
used interchangeably). 
3 See infra Section VI.A.  
4 See infra Conclusion and Recommendations. 
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I. A CASE ON POINT: THE D.C. CIRCUIT REMANDS THE 
CONSTELLIUM ROLLED PRODS. RAVENSWOOD, LLC, CASE TO THE 
NLRB WITH DIRECTIONS TO WEIGH THE TITLE VII EQUAL 
OPPORTUNITY IMPACTS OF WORKPLACE PROFANITY IN THE 
CONTEXT OF NLRA PROTECTED CONCERTED ACTIVITY
 In an industrial setting where the use of profane and vul-
gar language was common among employees and supervisors alike, 
a union represented a group of employees.5 When the long-term 
collective bargaining agreement expired, the union and the com-
pany failed to reach an agreement on a new policy for the as-
signment of overtime.6 In light of this impasse, the employer 
unilaterally implemented a new policy where employees would sign 
up for overtime seven days in advance and be subject to discipline 
for failure to work the overtime.7 The prior system involved so-
liciting employees in person or by telephone with no discipline 
for failure to work scheduled overtime, a much more employee-
friendly system.8
 In reaction to Constellium’s implementation of this new 
policy, the union filed unfair labor practice charges at the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board (NLRB), and more than fifty em-
ployees filed grievances.9 In addition, numerous employees engaged 
in a boycott of overtime work.10 Employee Jack Williams wrote 
‘whore board’ on the posted overtime signup sheet the evening 
before it would be taken down for the week, insinuating that those 
who signed up for overtime were loyal to the employer and not the 
union.11 It was notable that employees and supervisors often called 
the overtime signup sheet the ‘whore board’ before Williams wrote 
that name on the top of the sheet.12 However, Williams’ action 
5 Constellium Rolled Prods. Ravenswood, LLC., 366 N.L.R.B. No. 131, slip 
op. at 1–2 (July 24, 2018), reh’g denied, 2018 WL 5128410 (Oct. 17, 2018). The 
District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals granted Constellium’s petition 
for review, and in its decision, the court remanded the case to the NLRB for 
proceedings consistent with its opinion. See Constellium Rolled Prods. Ra-
venswood, LLC v. NLRB, 945 F.3d 546, 552 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (2–1 decision). 





11 Id. at 2.
12 Id.
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resulted in a five-day suspension followed by his termination.13
The question in the Constellium case is whether Williams’ action 
merited termination, or if it was protected concerted activity 
within the meaning of Section 7 of the National Labor Relations 
Act (NLRA).14
 At the Constellium facility, despite a general laxity toward 
profane and vulgar language in the workplace, the employer cited 
the following reason for suspending and subsequently firing em-
ployee Williams: he was “willfully and deliberately engaging in 
insulting and harassing conduct.”15 The Administrative Law 
Judge (ALJ) ruled there was no unfair labor practice, reasoning 
the employee was not engaged in the course of protected con-
certed activity relating to the overtime boycott.16 He found that 
although the employee communicated a group concern about the 
unilateral implementation of the new overtime policy, his written 
expression could not be protected by the Act because it consti-
tuted vandalism.17
 Thereafter, the NLRB engaged in an analysis, first consider-
ing whether the employee was engaged in a course of protected 
activity. The agency found that in writing “whore board,” “Williams 
was engaged in a continuing course of protected activity....”18 Next, 
the NLRB wrote that “the remaining question is whether [the em-
ployee’s] conduct cost him the protection of the Act.”19 “[W]hether 
pursuant to Atlantic Steel Co. or, alternatively, a totality-of-the-
circumstances test,” the Board found that Williams’ conduct did 
not lose the Act’s protection.20
 First, the Board weighed the Atlantic Steel factors.21 Specifi-
cally, the Board applied the facts in Constellium to each of the four 
13 Id. An arbitrator found the discipline excessive, ordering Williams’ rein-
stated but without backpay. See id. at 10. 
14 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2018). 
15 Constellium, 366 N.L.R.B., slip op. at 2. 
16 Id.
17 Id.
18 Id. (emphasis added).
19 Id. at 3.
20 Id. at 1. 
21 Id. at 3. The Atlantic Steel factors are: “(1) location; (2) subject matter; (3) 
the nature of the employee’s outburst; and (4) whether the outburst was, in any 
way, provoked by the employer’s unfair labor practice....” Id. After conducting 
its analysis, the Board ruled the employee’s conduct did not lose the protection of 
the Act. Id. (citing Atl. Steel Co., 245 N.L.R.B. 814 (1979)). 
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factors: as to 1) location: while in a high-profile location, the signup 
sheets were temporary; there was no evidence this activity dis-
rupted the workplace, and thus the Board found “this factor is 
neutral, or leaning marginally in favor of loss of protection”;22 as 
to 2) subject matter: the Board found it was clear from proximity 
in time and location that the employee was protesting the 
change to overtime policy, and thus “this factor strongly favored 
continued protection”;23 as to 3) the nature of the employee’s 
outburst: the Board saw this as a one-time incident that was 
spontaneous, and thus this favored continued protection;24 as to 
4) whether the employee’s conduct was provoked by an employer 
unfair labor practice (ULP): the Board found that the unilateral 
overtime policy implementation was actually not a ULP, the 
employer’s act precipitated the labor dispute and the union’s fil-
ing a ULP charge as well as the many grievances filed, led the 
employee to reasonably believe that the new policy was a ULP.25
The Board ruled that the provocation factor was neutral.26 After 
summing up the application of the facts to the four Atlantic Steel
factors, the Board concluded that Williams did not lose the pro-
tection of the Act and the employer committed a ULP.27
The employer, Constellium, suggested the alternative “totali-
ty-of-the-circumstances” test should apply because the “conduct 
did not occur during a workplace discussion with manage-
ment.”28 Applying that test, the Board still found the employer 
discipline of Williams unlawful because the employee miscon-
duct was not “so egregious as to lose the protection of the Act.”29
The Board referred to the dissent’s objection that the majority 
did not adequately consider arguments regarding the infringe-
ment of employer’s property rights that occurred when Williams 
defaced the overtime list with graffiti.30 The Board majority rea-
soned that both precedent and its analysis accounted for those 
22 Id.





28 Id. at 5. 
29 Id. (citing Consumers Power Co., 282 N.L.R.B. 130, 132 (1986)). 
30 Id. at 5 (referencing Member Emanuel’s dissent). 
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concerns and concluded that the balance of interests relating to 
Section 7 rights of the employee and the employer’s property rights 
still favored the employee.31 Constellium filed a motion for re-
consideration of the Board’s decision and order, and in an un-
published opinion, the NLRB denied Constellium’s motion.32
 The District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals granted 
the employer’s petition for review and the Board’s application to 
enforce its order.33 The three-member panel found “[t]he Board’s 
decision was based upon substantial evidence and did not im-
permissibly depart from precedent without explanation.”34 Un-
der the deferential standard of review used for agency decisions, 
the court was bound to “uphold[ ] the decision of the Board un-
less it was arbitrary or capricious or contrary to law.”35
 Constellium raised another issue on appeal, that “the Board 
ignored the Company’s obligations under federal and state anti-
discrimination laws to maintain a harassment-free workplace.”36
Rather than respond to the argument, the Board simply replied 
that the appeals court lacked jurisdiction to consider its argu-
ment because the Company did not timely raise its objection.37
The Court of Appeals disagreed, citing four specific instances in 
the record where the employer raised this concern during pro-
ceedings, and therefore the appeals court deemed the employer 
adequately “put the Board on notice that the issue might be pur-
sued on appeal.”38 Because the Board did not respond to the 
merits of Constellium’s argument that a failure to discipline an 
employee for defacing company property could create liability 
31 See id. See also Braden Campbell, Worker’s ‘Arguably Vulgar’ Writing 
Protected, NLRB Says, LAW360 (July 25, 2018, 6:34 PM), https://www.law360 
.com/articles/1066925/worker-s-arguably-vulgar-writing-protected-nlrb-says 
[https://perma.cc/N6X5-64CF] (discussing the Constellium Board’s majority 
and dissenting opinions). 
32 Constellium Rolled Prods. Ravenswood, LLC, 2018 WL 5128410, 1 
(N.L.R.B. 2018). 
33 Constellium Rolled Prods. Ravenswood, LLC v. N.L.R.B., 945 F.3d 546, 
548–49 (D.C. Cir. 2019). 
34 Id. at 548. 
35 Id. at 550 (quoting Oak Harbor Freight Lines, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 855 F.3d 
436, 440 (D.C. Cir. 2017)). 
36 Id. at 551. 
37 Id.
38 Id. at 551–52. 
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under equal employment opportunity law, the D.C. Circuit Court 
of Appeals ruled that it had “no choice but to remand the matter 
for the agency to address the issue in the first instance.”39 The 
court noted that where the NLRA “conflict[s] with another fed-
eral statute, the Board cannot ignore” it.40
 Thus, on the final day of 2019, a panel of the Court of Ap-
peals for the District of Columbia Circuit unanimously remanded 
the Constellium case to the NLRB to consider the impact of the 
employer’s duty to comply with equal employment opportunity 
laws at the federal and state level and any potential conflict with 
the NLRA.41 The Board’s failure to address the merits of Constelli-
um’s equal employment opportunity arguments necessitated the 
court’s remand.42 The next section addresses the NLRB’s efforts 
to seek feedback regarding the same issue in another recent case 
involving offensive workplace speech,43 General Motors.44
II. THE PIVOTAL CASE: THE NLRB CALLS FOR INPUT BEYOND THE 
FACE-TO-FACE FACTS OF THE GENERAL MOTORS CASE INVOLVING 
PROFANITY IN THE CONTEXT OF OTHERWISE PROTECTED ACTIVITY,
SIDESTEPPING ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT RULEMAKING
 In September 2019, a Board majority solicited input on 
another workplace profanity case, General Motors LLC.45 The 
39 Id. at 552. 
40 Id. at 551 (quoting Can-Am Plumbing, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 321 F.3d 145, 153–
54 (D.C. Cir. 2003)); see also Consol. Comms., Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 837 F.3d 1, 20–21 
(D.C. Cir. 2016) (Millett, J., concurring). 
41 Constellium Rolled Prods., 945 F.3d at 552. See Vin Gurrieri, DC Circ. 
Tells NLRB to Assess ‘Conflict’ in Labor, EEO Laws, LAW360 (Jan. 2, 2020, 
7:43 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1230784/dc-circ-tells-nlrb-to-assess    
-conflict-in-labor-eeo-laws [https://perma.cc/6QLH-9FDK] (noting D.C. Circuit 
shined “an appellate spotlight on a ‘potential conflict’ in employment statutes 
that the NLRB recently moved to address.”). 
42 Constellium Rolled Prods., 945 F.3d at 552.
43 See infra Part II. 
44 Gen. Motors II, 368 N.L.R.B. No. 68, slip op. at 1–2 (Sept. 5, 2019) (3–1 
decision). 
45 Id. Then-member McFerran objected to the majority’s broad notice and 
called for input regarding revisiting the standards in past decisions not impli-
cated on the facts in General Motors. See id. at 4. She advocated rulemaking as a 
more appropriate procedure for such reconsideration, noting that federal courts 
had enforced the Board’s decisions in two of the three questioned cases, while 
the third went unchallenged. See id. In addition, no federal court has rejected 
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the Board’s legal approach in these cases. Id. The majority of the NLRB justi-
fied its notice and call for briefs as it was: 
[m]indful of ... criticism ... [for NLRB workplace protections of 
profane, racially or sexually offensive language as morally 
unacceptable and inconsistent with other workplace laws], 
[and thus the Board invited] the parties and interested amici to 
file briefs to aid the Board in reconsidering the standards for 
determining whether profane outbursts and offensive statements 
of a racial or sexual nature, made in the course of otherwise pro-
tected activity, lose the employee who utters them the protection 
of the Act. The Board asks the parties and amici to address 
either some or all of the following questions, as they see fit. 
1. Under what circumstances should profane language or sex-
ually or racially offensive speech lose the protection of the 
Act? In Plaza Auto, although the nature of Aguirre’s outburst 
weighed against protection, the Board found that the other three 
Atlantic Steel factors favored protection, and it concluded that 
Aguirre retained the Act’s protection. And although the Plaza
Auto majority did not say that the nature of the outburst 
could never result in loss of protection where the other three 
factors tilt the other way, it also did not say that it ever could. 
Are there circumstances under which the “nature of the em-
ployee’s outburst” factor should be dispositive as to loss of 
protection, regardless of the remaining Atlantic Steel factors? 
Why or why not? 
2. The Board has held that employees must be granted some 
leeway when engaged in Section 7 activity because “[t]he pro-
tections Section 7 affords would be meaningless were we not 
to take into account the realities of industrial life and the fact 
that disputes over wages, hours, and working conditions are 
among the disputes most likely to engender ill feelings and 
strong responses.” Consumers Power Co., 282 NLRB 130, 132 
(1986). To what extent should this principle remain applicable 
with respect to profanity or language that is offensive to oth-
ers on the basis of race or sex? 
3. In determining whether an employee’s outburst is unpro-
tected, the Board has considered the norms of the workplace, 
particularly whether profanity is commonplace and tolerated. 
See, e.g., Traverse City Osteopathic Hospital, 260 NLRB 1061 
(1982). Should the Board continue to do so? If the norms of 
the workplace are relevant, should the Board consider em-
ployer work rules, such as those that prohibit profanity, bully-
ing, or uncivil behavior? 
4. Should the Board adhere to, modify, or abandon the standard 
the Board applied in, e.g., Cooper Tire, supra, Airo Die Casting,
347 NLRB 810 (2006), Nickell Moulding, 317 NLRB 826 (1995), 
enf. denied sub nom. NMC Finishing v. NLRB, 101 F.3d 528 (8th 
Cir. 1996), and Calliope Designs, 297 NLRB 510 (1989), to the 
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General Motors case involved an employee named Charles Robinson 
who served as a union committee person, and a delegate on the 
Union’s international constitution.46 Robinson represented bar-
gaining unit members in meetings with management on contract 
issues, discipline, and bargaining relating to terms and condi-
tions of employment.47 Robinson directed a profane outburst at 
his supervisor while Robinson served as a union representative, 
discussing overtime pay sought for required additional train-
ing.48 During their meeting, Robinson got physically close to the 
supervisor and engaged in a heated discussion overheard by 
other employees outside the meeting room.49 Robinson said, 
“You don’t run this. I do. And if you want to play ... this fucking 
game, we’ll play this fucking game.”50 Further, Robinson said 
“[f]uck you, and you can shove cross-training up your fuckin’ 
ass.”51 Robinson received a suspension for the rest of his shift 
plus three days.52 While Robinson engaged in concerted activity 
that was protected under the NLRA, the question remained 
whether his language and manner were egregiously offensive 
such that he lost the Act’s protection.53
extent it permitted a finding in those cases that radically or 
sexually offensive language on a picket line did not lose the 
protection of the Act? To what extent, if any, should the Board 
continue to consider context—e.g., picket-line setting—when 
determining whether racially or sexually offensive language 
loses the Act’s protection? What other factors, if any, should 
the Board deem relevant to that determination? Should the 
use of such language compel a finding of loss of protection? 
Why or why not? 
5. What relevance should the Board accord to antidiscrimina-
tion laws such as Title VII in determining whether an em-
ployee’s statements lose the protection of the Act? How should 
the Board accommodate both the employers’ duty to comply 
with such laws and its own duty to protect employees in exer-
cising the Section 7 rights? 
Id. at 2–3.
46 Gen. Motors v. Robinson (Gen Motors I), 14-CA-197985, JD-59-18, slip 
op. at 2 (NLRB Div. of Judges Sept. 18, 2018). 
47 Id. at 2. 
48 Id. at 3. 
49 Id. at 4. 
50 Id. at 5. 
51 Id.
52 Id. at 6. 
53 Id. at 1. 
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 Upon his return to work after the initial suspension, Rob-
inson attended a meeting about subcontracting out some work.54
In response to Robinson’s questions about work, hours, and 
shifts for the bargaining unit employees, the supervisor told him 
not to worry and warned that Robinson was “getting too loud.”55
Robinson requested documentation regarding costs that he had 
previously requested by email and the supervisor told Robinson 
he felt intimidated, and that Robinson was “acting unprofes-
sional.”56 After the supervisor requested Robinson to again lower 
his voice, Robinson replied, “Yes, Master, Sir. Yes, Master, Sir.”57
Robinson received notice of another disciplinary action, and he 
then filed grievances relating to this second round of discipline.58
 After management discussions with Robinson on the de-
sire to move from a one to a two-shift schedule, Robinson provid-
ed feedback that “these moves are going to be messed up”59 and 
“[i]t’s going to create chaos on the floor.”60 Some meeting partici-
pants were unclear whether Robinson’s statements were more of 
an opinion or a threat.61 At some point during a meeting with 
several managers, Robinson’s phone played music including that 
by Public Enemy, “Straight out of Compton,” “Fuck the Police” 
and “Dope Man,” that contained offensive lyrics and words such 
as “N****r,” “Fuck the police” and other profanity.62 Supervisors 
maintained the music was loud, obscene, threatening, and dis-
ruptive.63 During a disciplinary meeting, Robinson replied that 
54 Id. at 7. 
55 Id.
56 Id. at 7–8. 
57 Id. at 8. Robinson stated that he told management he is a Black man 
and that Black men talk with authority. Id. at 9 n.15. 
58 Id. at 10. 
59 Id. at 12. 
60 Id.
61 Id.
62 Id. at 13. Robinson testified that only one song played, namely the rela-
tively innocuous country tune, “Friends in Low Places,” sung by Garth Brooks. Id.
The ALJ credited the management witnesses over Robinson’s testimony regarding 
the music Robinson played on his phone that contained objectionable words.
Id. at 16. 
63 Id. at 13–14.  
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such music is acceptable on the work floor because of the auto 
plant environment.64 Robinson was once again suspended.65
 The ALJ made credibility findings in favor of manage-
ment witnesses over Robinson’s own testimony, failing to believe 
Robinson’s testimony “that he never threatened [his supervi-
sor].”66 Since Robinson’s discipline on all three occasions occurred 
solely for his conduct during meetings with management offi-
cials, the ALJ announced the appropriate analysis as whether 
his conduct in those meetings was initially protected under the 
Act and, if so, whether he ultimately forfeited that protection.67
The ALJ utilized the NLRB’s Atlantic Steel Co.68 analytical 
framework that “allows the Board to balance employees’ rights 
with the employer’s interest in maintaining workplace order and 
discipline.”69 The four factors considered in the Atlantic Steel
balancing test are: “1) the location of the discussion; 2) the sub-
ject matter of the discussion; 3) the nature of the employees’ 
outburst; and 4) whether the outburst was provoked by the em-
ployer’s unfair labor practices.”70 The ALJ in General Motors ap-
plied these four factors to each of the three incidents for which 
Robinson was disciplined to determine if the employer commit-
ted an unfair labor practice.71
 As to the first incident at the April 11, 2017 meeting, the 
ALJ concluded: 1) the location favored protection. Even though the 
first meeting occurred on the shop floor, it did not interrupt op-
erations.72 2) The subject matter concerned a work-related disa-
greement the ALJ determined to have originated in Robinson’s 
honest and sincere belief that the supervisor breached a verbal 
agreement on overtime coverage with the union.73 Thus, the ALJ 
found that the subject matter weighed in favor of protection.74
As to 3), the ALJ found that there is some leeway for impulsive 
64 Id. 15. It is noteworthy that the meeting was not on the work floor. Id. 
at 2. 
65 Id. at 15. 
66 Id.
67 Id. at 17. 
68 Id. (citing Atl. Steel Co., 245 N.L.R.B. 814 (1979)). 
69 Id.
70 Id.
71 Id. at 17–25. 
72 Id. at 18. 
73 Id.
74 Id.
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behavior when engaged in protected concerted activity, and Rob-
inson was zealously protecting the interests of unit employees.75
It did not exceed the employer’s right to maintain order and respect 
in the workplace.76 With respect to the final factor, the ALJ found 
that 4) while there was no evidence that the supervisor commit-
ted an unfair labor practice, this factor slightly favored protection 
based on Robinson’s honest belief that the refusal to pay over-
time constituted an unfair labor practice as well as a breach of the 
agreement.77 The ALJ held that all four Atlantic Steel factors sup-
ported Robinson with respect to his April 11 conduct, and that the 
employer committed an unfair labor practice by unlawfully sus-
pending him for directing a profane outburst at a supervisor during 
a discussion of work-related matters that were protected activity.78
 In the second incident, Robinson met with management on 
April 25, 2017, serving in his role as union representative dis-
cussing the subcontracting of work.79 Robinson was engaged in 
protected activity as the conversation related to collective bar-
gaining issues and its impact on his constituents.80 Once again 
applying the Atlantic Steel factors, the ALJ found that: 1) the meet-
ing place is a closed-door room weighed in favor of protection as 
it did not disrupt the workforce or interfere with management of 
production; 2) the subject matter weighed in favor of protection, as 
the conversation involved terms and conditions of employment; 3) 
the nature of Robinson’s outburst, calling supervisor Stevens “Mas-
ter,” indicating that Stevens wanted him to act like a slave, was a 
“prolonged side tirade” against Stevens, and “moderately weigh[ed] 
against protection” for Robinson;81 and finally, 4) Robinson’s out-
burst was not provoked by an employer unfair labor practice.82
Thus, the ALJ found that two of four of the factors weighed against 
Robinson and he lost the protection of the Act, so that discipline 
issued relating to this meeting was not an unfair labor practice.83
75 Id. at 19. 
76 Id.
77 Id. at 21. 
78 Id.
79 Id.
80 Id. at 21–22. 
81 Id. at 22–23. 
82 Id. at 23. 
83 Id.
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 With respect to the third encounter, the ALJ found that 
Robinson’s October 17, 2017 meeting with management about 
manpower issues involved protected activity in light of the im-
pact of a new classification of jobs, which would affect bargain-
ing unit work and manpower.84 Once again, the meeting was 
closed-door and thus, in terms of the Atlantic Steel factors: 1) the 
place weighed in favor of protection; 2) the subject matter weighed 
in favor of protection, although the ALJ found “questionable” 
whether Robinson’s threat and disruptive, offensive music were 
protected; 3) the nature of Robinson’s outburst and “overall be-
havior” at the meeting were “sufficiently opprobrious” that they 
weighed against protection, and 4) Robinson’s conduct was not 
provoked by an employer unfair labor practice.85 The ALJ found 
that with two of the four factors weighing against Robinson, and 
with “the nature of the outburst weigh[ing] heavily against pro-
tection,” as well as the fourth factor, the employer was justified 
in suspending him.86
 In light of the above, the ALJ in General Motors ordered 
the employer to cease and desist engaging in unfair labor prac-
tices and to make Robinson whole with back pay and interest 
compounded daily regarding the employer’s April 11 unfair labor 
practice of suspending him for protected concerted activity.87
 Respondent General Motors filed exceptions to the ALJ’s 
decision, requesting in its brief that the NLRB overrule three of 
the Board’s earlier decisions regarding when “extremely profane 
or racially offensive language” will not cause employees to lose the 
NLRA’s protection.88 The Board pondered how much influence 
the context of the language or conduct should play, whether the 
84 Id. at 23–24 
85 Id. at 24–25. 
86 Id. at 25. 
87 Id. at 27. 
88 Gen. Motors II, 368 N.L.R.B. No. 68, slip op. at 1–2 (Sept. 5, 2019) (ref-
erencing Plaza Auto Ctr., 360 N.L.R.B. 972 (2014) (involving face-to-face ac-
tivity in work meeting), Pier Sixty LLC, 362 N.L.R.B. 505 (2015) (involving 
social media posting), enforced, 855 F.3d 115 (2d. Cir. 2017), and Cooper Tire 
& Rubber Co., 363 N.L.R.B. 194 (2016) (involving picket line speech), en-
forced, 866 F.3d 885 (8th Cir. 2017)). While the Board in General Motors did 
not mention it, the Pier Sixty case involved profanity that was sexually offensive. 
N.L.R.B. v. Pier Sixty, LLC, 855 F.3d 115, 118 (2d. Cir. 2017). 
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fact that such language was normal in that workplace should be 
relevant, as well as whether the Board should consider antidis-
crimination laws in determining if the employee’s language lost 
the protection of the Act.89
 Member McFerran dissented in General Motors, highlighting 
the Board’s responsibility to interpret the Act in the context of 
the “‘realities of industrial life [including] the fact that disputes 
over wages, hours, and working conditions are among the disputes 
most likely to engender ill feelings and strong responses.’”90
McFerran objected to the Board majority’s call for input because 
it went well beyond the facts in the instant General Motors case 
involving workplace meetings, to reconsider other unrelated con-
texts such as picket lines and online posts.91 She objected to the 
Board’s calling for input in General Motors as seeking “a com-
prehensive rework of Board precedent outside the circumstances 
of the case at hand, [when] rulemaking would be the more ap-
propriate procedure.”92 Alternatively, the Board could consoli-
date several cases with the varying fact patterns it wished to 
address, but she intoned that what the Board did was “impa-
tient” in that it did not wait for these fact patterns to present 
themselves, and instead used the General Motors case to “address 
issues that are clearly not presented.”93
 Member McFerran noted further that the Board uses two 
different tests for evaluating picket line and online conduct and 
that a third test applies to face-to-face activity, as evidenced in the 
instant case.94 She wrote that the Board majority misrepresented 
the extent of judicial criticism of the Board’s approach in this area, 
noting that no federal court has rejected the Board’s approach or its 
specific tests.95 Similarly, she found that the majority’s citation 
89 Gen. Motors II, 368 N.L.R.B., slip op. at 2–3. 
90 Id. at 4 (McFerran, M., dissenting) (citing Consumers Power Co., 282 
N.L.R.B. 130, 132 (1986)). 
91 Id. at 4. 
92 Id. (citing to Member McFerran’s dissent for the same reason as when the 
Board majority pronounced new rules extending beyond the facts of the case 
in Boeing Co., 365 N.L.R.B. 154, at 33–34 (2017) (McFerran, M., dissenting). 
Id. at 4 n.5. 
93 Id. at 4.
94 Id.
95 Id.
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to an EEOC Task Force report and its recommendation with re-
spect to the clarification and harmonization of the NLRA and EEO 
statutes with respect to the permissible content of workplace ci-
vility codes was inapposite.96 Rather than the EEOC objecting to 
the NLRB’s rules, Member McFerran noted that the EEOC rec-
ognized that broad workplace civility rules could interfere with 
protected speech under the NLRA.97 McFerran dissented because 
she thought that the Board could and should decide the General
Motors case under existing precedent.98 While the various stake-
holders awaited the NLRB’s decision in General Motors after its 
receipt of amicus briefs, more such cases involving profanity and 
protected concerted activity continued to accumulate.99 In addi-
tion, NLRB decisions based upon existing standards continued to 
be sustained as long as these decisions were based upon substantial 
evidence on the record as a whole, and the agency appropriately 
applied the law, as is discussed next.100
III. THE SECOND CIRCUIT ENFORCES THE NLRB’S ORDER TO 
REINSTATE FOUR EMPLOYEES WHO REPLIED TO A GROUP EMAIL 
CONTAINING PROFANITY THAT CRITIQUED WORKING CONDITIONS 
AND MANAGEMENT IN MEXICAN RADIO CORP.
 In another case involving email among restaurant em-
ployees in New York City, the Court of Appeals for the Second 
Circuit issued a summary order denying Mexican Radio’s peti-
tion for review, and enforcing the NLRB’s order.101 After the hiring 
of a new general manager, four of Mexican Radio’s wait staff 
96 Id. at 4 n.8. 
97 Id.
98 Id. at 4. Member McFerran’s term expired in Dec. 16, 2019. She was re-
appointed as part of a package deal at the end of July, 2020. See Proskauer, 
Labor Relations Update, Senate Confirms Pair of Appointees to National La-
bor Relations Board, July 30, 2020, https://www.laborrelationsupdate.com/un 
categorized/senate-confirms-pair-of-appointees-to-national-labor-relations-board/ 
[https://perma.cc/2XRE-55CX]. See infra note 280 and accompanying text. 
99 Rachel Adams Ladeau, NLRB poised to trim protections for offensive com-
ments, N.E. IN-HOUSE (Feb. 27, 2020), https://newenglandinhouse.com/20 
20/02/27/nlrb-poised-to-trim-protections-for-offensive-comments/ [https://perma 
.cc/Y4X3-K6VH]. 
100 See Mexican Radio Corp. v. N.L.R.B., 789 Fed. Appx. 261, 266 (2d Cir. 2019). 
101 Id. at 262. 
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lodged complaints with the company’s director of operations re-
garding the general manager’s disrespectful and demeaning treat-
ment of employees, as well as the unsanitary conditions at the 
restaurant.102 When conditions did not improve, the employees 
contacted the state Department of Health, angering manage-
ment.103 Thereafter a bartender/server resigned in an email that 
she sent to owners, managers, and certain employees, outlining 
the problems at the restaurant and management’s failure to ad-
dress same, alleging mismanagement, tax fraud, and that the gen-
eral manager had designs on the porters.104 The email contained 
obscenities and included a direction to employees to “stand up 
for their rights.”105 The four wait staff replied to all, agreeing 
with the email’s author and thereafter were fired over the next 
two days.106 The employer cited insubordination, false accusa-
tions against management and ownership, as well as use of in-
appropriate language.107
 The ALJ in Mexican Radio determined that the employees 
had engaged in NLRA-protected concerted activity when they 
supported the resigning employee’s email and that their email 
replies were not so opprobrious that they lost the protection of 
the Act.108 The ALJ found that the employer violated the Act by 
discipline and discharge of the four employees due to their emails 
because: they merely agreed to a nonpublic email from a former 
employee; did not describe their feelings or animosity toward the 
manager; never cursed or made any derogatory comments toward 
the managers; the email was part of an ongoing dialogue between 
workers and managers; the email did not cause a loss of reputa-
tion to the company; and finally, there was no disruption to 
business.109 The NLRB upheld the ALJ, while noting one addi-
tional employer violation.110
 The Second Circuit agreed with the NLRB, finding that 
the employees’ activity did not lose protection under either the 
102 Id. at 262–63. 






109 Id. at 263–65. 
110 Id. at 263–64. 
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traditional face-to-face standard of Atlantic Steel or the more 
appropriate totality of the circumstances standard applied to so-
cial media in Pier Sixty.111 The appellate court reviewed the four 
factors from Atlantic Steel, finding, as the NLRB did, that: 1) the 
place of discussion factor, a limited email group, weighed in favor 
of the employees, 2) the subject matter of the email discussion 
involved conditions of employment weighing in favor of protec-
tion, 3) the nature of the outburst as illustrated in the employee 
replies to the original email illustrated protected statements 
with no animosity, cursing, or derogatory comments about man-
agement which again weighed in favor of employee protection, 4) 
regarding whether an employer unfair labor practice provoked the 
emails, there was evidence that the general manager’s response to 
employees was threatening, in that he remarked if the employ-
ees did not like it at the restaurant, they could look for another 
job and leave, and thus the Board found that the emails were 
provoked by an unfair labor practice, namely, the implicit threat 
of discharge.112 The Second Circuit found that the NLRB “ap-
propriately focused on the [e]mployees’ replies,” rather than the 
initial email from the former employee, concluding that the em-
ployees did not add to negative or derogatory comments nor did 
the employees curse as the initial email did, and that all four At-
lantic Steel factors weighed in favor of the employees.113
 In light of the examples in the preceding cases,114 where 
should employers and the NLRB draw the line on offensive speech 
111 Id. at 264. 
112 Id. at 264–65. 
113 Id. at 265. See Braden Campbell, Fired Servers’ Emails Shielded by Labor 
Law, 2nd Circ. Says, LAW360 (Oct. 15, 2019, 6:54 PM), https://www.law360 
.com/articles/1209461/fired-servers-emails-shielded-by-labor-law-2nd-circ-says 
[https://perma.cc/RCN2-N6JP]. 
114 There are many more cases involving profanity in the context of other-
wise NLRA-protected concerted activity, and this issue is not going away. See, 
e.g., Alle Processing Corp., 369 N.L.R.B. 52 (2020) (involving NLRB order to re-
instate food worker terminated for using profanity and raising his middle finger 
at a human resources representative after being pressured to sign union dues 
checkoff form he opposed and was legally entitled not to sign); Adam Lidget, 
NLRB Tells Food Co. to Rehire Worker Irked by Union Dues, LAW360 (Apr. 3, 
2020, 7:32 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1260245/nlrb-tells-food-co-to 
-rehire-worker-irked-by-union-dues [https://perma.cc/7DTS-9XYY]; cf. Quicken 
Loans, Inc., 367 N.L.R.B. 112, 1–2 (2019) (NLRB ruling that worker did not 
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that potentially interferes with equal employment opportunity 
rights? To answer this question, the next sections review the 
relevant rules that the NLRB laid out regarding employee loss 
of protection under the NLRA, as well as analysis of the three 
cases that the Board requested comment on115 in the General
Motors appeal.116
IV. BACKGROUND ON THE NLRB STANDARDS
A. The Atlantic Steel117 Standard 
 The Atlantic Steel case involved an employee’s use of ob-
scenity to a supervisor on the production floor following a question 
concerning working conditions.118 When discussing a grievance, 
employee Kenneth Chastain used profane language to other em-
ployees, for example “motherfucker liar” and/or “lying son of a 
bitch” about their supervisor within the hearing of the supervisor.119
The question raised was whether this was protected concerted 
activity and thus the discharge an unfair labor practice, or was 
it insubordination for which employee Chastain could be fired.120
Under the standard pronounced in Atlantic Steel, whether the 
employee crossed that line with opprobrious conduct in the con-
text of otherwise NLRA-protected conduct depends upon several 
factors: 1) the place of the discussion, 2) the subject matter of the 
discussion, 3) the nature of the employee’s outburst, and 4) whether 
the outburst was, in any way, provoked by an employer’s unfair 
labor practice.121 In Atlantic Steel, the Board upheld the employee’s 
engage in protected concerted activity when in a restroom using profanity in 
context of bank customer). 
115 See infra Part IV. 
116 Gen. Motors II, 368 N.L.R.B. No. 68, slip op. at 1 (Sept. 5, 2019) (3–1 deci-
sion).
117 Atl. Steel Co., 245 N.L.R.B. 814, 816 (1979) (3–0 decision, 1 concurrence). 
118 Id. at 814.
119 Id.
120 As the NLRB and an arbitrator before that noted, Chastain’s discharge 
was not for one incident. Id. at 816. Rather, his work record was checkered 
with thirty-two instances of tardiness, seven unexplained absences, as well as 
two prior suspensions and warnings, one involving profanity in front of women, 
despite being warned against using such language. Id. at 814. 
121 Id. at 816. 
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dismissal, finding there was a reasonable basis for his discharge 
as his conduct was not covered by NLRA protections.122 Rather, 
Chastain’s obscene and insubordinate outburst on the work floor 
occurred without provocation and in a context where profanity 
“was not normally tolerated.”123 The takeaway from this case is 
that the Board’s Atlantic Steel test allows the NLRB to weigh 
four very relevant factors to balance when deciding if an em-
ployee’s workplace misconduct that is otherwise protected by the 
Act, should remain protected, or lose the Act’s protection.124
B. The Lutheran Heritage125 Standard 
 The Lutheran Heritage NLRB opinion established that 
employer civility rules are unlawful if they explicitly restrict ac-
tivities protected by the NLRA.126 Should the rules be facially 
neutral, they still may violate the NLRA if: 1) employees would 
reasonably construe the rule to prohibit Section 7 activity; 2) the 
rule was written in response to union activity; or 3) the rule was 
applied to restrict exercise of Section 7 activity.127
 Employer’s facially neutral civility “rules prohibiting ‘abusive 
and profane language,’ ‘harassment,’ and ‘verbal, mental and physi-
cal abuse’ were lawful because they intended to maintain order 
in the employer’s workplace and did not explicitly or implicitly 
prohibit Section 7 activity.”128 In considering whether the mere 
maintenance of certain work rules violates the NLRA, “the ap-
propriate inquiry is whether the rules would reasonably tend to 
chill employees in the exercise of their Section 7 rights.”129 The 
Board in Lutheran advised further that in determining whether a 
challenged rule is unlawful, the Board must “give the rule a rea-
sonable reading.”130 This reasonable reading starts with whether 
the rule explicitly restricts activities protected by Section 7, in 
122 Id. at 817. 
123 Id.
124 Id. at 816. 
125 Martin Luther Mem’l Home, Inc. (Lutheran Heritage), 343 N.L.R.B. 646 
(2004) (3–2 decision). 
126 Id. at 646. 
127 Id. at 646–47. 
128 Id. at 646. 
129 Id. at 654 (citing Lafayette Park Hotel, 326 N.L.R.B. 824, 825 (1998)). 
130 Id. at 646. 
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which case, the Board will find the rule unlawful.131 Absent ex-
plicit restriction of activity protected by Section 7, “the violation 
is dependent upon a showing of one of the following: 1) employ-
ees would reasonably construe the language to prohibit Section 
7 activity; 2) the rule was promulgated in response to union ac-
tivity; or 3) the rule has been applied to restrict the exercise of 
Section 7 rights.”132
 In Lutheran, employee Vivian Foreman, a union supporter, 
and steward was disciplined for use of profanity and verbally 
harassing and abusing a supervisor in front of several co-workers, 
and verbally abusing a supervisor by using profanity in refer-
ence to her.133 The Board noted that: “[t]he question of whether 
particular employee activity involving verbal abuse or profanity 
is protected by Section 7 turns on the specific facts of each case.”134
In Members Liebman and Walsh’s partial dissent, they pointed 
out that: “[t]he Respondent’s rule prohibiting ‘abusive or profane 
language ... directed toward a supervisor’ and its rule prohibiting, 
inter alia, ‘verbally ... abusing ... a supervisor’ are ambiguous and 
hence overbroad. Neither rule provides specific examples of the 
prohibited speech.”135 Nonetheless, the Board found that “in the 
instant case, reasonable employees would not read the rule [to 
prohibit Section 7 activity].”136
 The takeaway from the Board’s 2014 Lutheran Heritage 
decision was that many facially neutral work rules could be con-
strued as an impediment to employees’ ability to exercise their 
Section 7 rights.137 In subsequent years, the Board’s ‘reasonably 
construe’ standard expanded the scope of NLRA-protected activ-
ity and invalidated numerous work rules found in employee 
handbooks.138 The Board next altered its work rule standard in 
this area in 2017, as discussed next.139
131 Id.
132 Id. at 647. 
133 Id. at 655. 
134 Id. at 647. 
135 Id. at 650 (Liebman, M., and Walsh, M., dissenting in part). 
136 Id. at 648. 
137 Boeing Co., 365 N.L.R.B. No. 154 (2017). 
138 Id. at 2. 
139 See infra Section IV.C. 
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C. The Boeing140 Test for Employer Work Rules Overrules the
Lutheran Heritage ‘Reasonably Construe’ Standard for
Evaluating the Legality of Facially Neutral Work Rules 
 In Boeing Co.,141 the NLRB formulated a new standard to 
evaluate facially neutral employment policies. The rule in ques-
tion at Boeing was a no-camera policy that prohibited employees 
from using cameras in the workplace without a valid business need, 
as well as an approved permit.142 Maintaining this employer policy, 
one of many employer work rules at Boeing, violated the NLRA, 
an NLRB ALJ found while applying the Lutheran Heritage ‘rea-
sonably construe’ test.143 Upon Boeing’s appeal to the NLRB, the 
Board decided to overrule the Lutheran Heritage ‘reasonable con-
strue’ standard.144 The Board stated that “[p]aradoxically Lutheran
Heritage is too simplistic at the same time it is too difficult to 
apply,” and faulted the test’s inability to deal with “the complex-
ities of industrial life.”145 For example, the Board noted that the 
ALJ below failed to weigh Boeing’s security need, illustrating 
one of the problems with the Lutheran Heritage test.146
 Under Boeing, workplace rules that may impact profane 
speech and conduct are now sorted into three categories.147 Cat-
egory 1 rules are generally lawful (for example, the Board major-
ity in Boeing referenced the no-camera rule in the instant 
case).148 Category 2 rules warrant individualized scrutiny de-
termining whether the business justification outweighs interfer-
ence with NLRA rights (for example, civility rules prohibiting 
criticism of employer).149 Category 3 rules are per se unlawful 
(for example, confidentiality rules prohibiting discussion of wages 
and working conditions).150 The Board announced a two-factor 
140 Boeing, 365 N.L.R.B., slip op. at 3. 
141 Id.
142 Id. at 1. 
143 Id.
144 Id. at 2. 
145 Id.
146 Id.
147 Id. at 3–4. 
148 Id. at 3. 
149 Id. at 4. 
150 Id.
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analysis for assessing the language of facially neutral work rules: 
“(i) the nature and extent of the rule’s potential impact on NLRA 
rights; and (ii) legitimate justifications associated with the rule.”151
The Board noted that while maintenance of rules may be lawful, 
the application of those rules to employees who have engaged in 
Section 7 activities may nevertheless violate Section 7 depend-
ing on the circumstances.152
 Member Pearce dissented in part, criticizing the overturn-
ing of 13-year-old precedent in favor of a new analysis, which he 
asserted is “[o]verly protective of employer interests and under-
protective of employee rights.”153 Member McFerran also dissented 
in part to the Board decision in Boeing, finding the majority’s 
process “arbitrary and capricious,” and the result “alarmingly 
flawed.”154 Member McFerran objected to “secret rulemaking” with-
out notice or comment, and overruling precedent when no party 
asked the Board to do such, acting sua sponte in order to install 
a new test that “simply fails to address the labor law problem before 
the Board: that employees may be chilled from exercising their 
statutory rights by overbroad employer rules.”155 As Member 
McFerran lamented, the Board majority adopted broad new rules 
that went beyond the facts in Boeing, for example, upholding the 
lawfulness of civility rules when there was no such rule involved 
in the Boeing case, without even asking for briefs from the public.156
 The key takeaway from the Boeing decision is that the 
NLRB established a new standard balancing test for assessing 
loss of protection where workplace rules are facially neutral.157
Rules are presumed lawful so long as employees are unlikely to 
interpret them as an impediment to their ability to exercise rights, 
as evaluated by a balancing test between employers’ legitimate 
151 Id. at 3. 
152 Id. at 4. 
153 Id. at 23 (Pearce, M., dissenting in part). 
154 Id. at 29 (McFerran, M., dissenting in part). 
155 Id. at 26–31. 
156 Id. at 33. See also Hassan A. Kanu, Labor Board Creates New Standards 
for Employers’ Handbooks, BLOOMBERG L.: DAILY LAB. REP. (Dec. 14, 2017), https:// 
news.bloomberglaw.com/daily-labor-report/labor-board-creates-new-standards  
-for-employers-handbooks [https://perma.cc/Z8PD-C64S] (noting that in Boeing,
“new Republican majority at the labor board did away with limits on employer 
handbook rules” left over from 2015 Democrat-controlled board). 
157 Boeing, 365 N.L.R.B., slip op. at 15–17. 
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justification for work rules and how the rules adversely impact 
NLRA rights.158
 The Boeing rule for assessing handbook rules is signifi-
cantly more employer-friendly than Lutheran Heritage, setting a 
renewed priority on employer interests.159 Nonetheless, as EEOC 
Commissioner Chai Feldblum outlined the issue to lawyers at 
an ABA conference post-Boeing, where an employer civility rule 
is used “to punish someone for union activity—guess what?—
that will be a problem.”160 One might note regarding the Board’s 
processes for revising policies by overturning precedent, that in 
General Motors, at least the NLRB did solicit amicus briefs on 
whether the standards illustrated in three Board decisions should 
be changed or maintained, unlike the Board in Boeing, which 
overruled Lutheran Heritage without requesting any input.161 In 
addition, General Motors’ exceptions brief did urge the Board to 
overrule Plaza Auto, Pier Sixty, and Cooper Tire,162 and thus, when 
the GM Board took the bait, so to speak, at least it was requested 
to do so by one of the parties, and not of its own initiative. The 
next section analyzes the factual context, rules applied, and out-
comes in those three NLRB decisions.163
V. THE 2014–16 TRILOGY OF DECISIONS THAT THE NLRB
CALLED FOR INPUT ON IN GENERAL MOTORS: PLAZA AUTO,
PIER SIXTY, AND COOPER TIRE
A. Plaza Auto Center, Inc.164: The Board Considers Profanity in 
the Context of Face-to-Face Protected Concerted Activity (2014) 
 In a disciplinary meeting with his supervisor, the owner 
of the Plaza auto dealership, and the office manager, a salesman 
158 Id.
159 Id. at 2. 
160 See Chris Opfer & Robert Iafolla, Harassment in Workplace May Seem 
Obvious, Except When It Isn’t, BLOOMBERG L.: DAILY LAB. REP. (Nov. 20, 2018), 
https://news.bloomberglaw.com/daily-labor-report/harassment-in-workplace-may 
-seem-obvious-except-when-it-isnt [https://perma.cc/U32F-KLJB]. 
161 Gen. Motors II, 368 N.L.R.B. No. 68, slip op. at 2 (Sept. 5, 2019). 
162 Id. at 1. 
163 See infra Part V. 
164 360 N.L.R.B. 972 (2014) (2–1 decision). 
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named Nick Aguirre was faulted for “talking a lot of negative 
stuff ... [and] asking too many questions,” many of which related 
to working conditions and pay, including the computation of com-
missions.165 Tony Plaza, the employer, twice responded to Aguirre’s 
complaints that he could work elsewhere if he did not trust the 
employer.166 Aguirre knocked back his chair and replied “[you’re 
a] fucking crook,” a “fucking mother fucking,” “an asshole,” and 
stated that nobody liked the boss and that if he, Aguirre was 
fired, the employer will “regret it.”167 Aguirre was then fired.168
 The ALJ found that the employer committed violations of 
the Act by inviting the employee to quit after he voiced his pro-
tests that were protected under the Act.169 Nonetheless, the judge 
found that Aguirre lost the protection of the Act because of his 
“belligerent” statements and behavior, including profanity and 
menacing conduct.170 Upon appeal, the NLRB applied the stan-
dard from Atlantic Steel and analyzed the traditional four fac-
tors: 1) the place of the discussion; 2) the subject matter; 3) the 
nature of the outburst; and 4) whether the outburst was in any 
way provoked by a ULP.171 The NLRB overturned the ALJ’s de-
cision that the obscene and threatening outburst was not pro-
tected, and found that the employer violated the Act by firing 
Aguirre.172 Upon appeal to the Ninth Circuit, the court agreed 
with the NLRB’s determination of three of the four factors from 
Atlantic Steel but determined that the Board erred in finding 
that the nature of the outburst factor weighed in favor of the 
salesman.173 The court remanded to the Board to have it “properly 
consider whether the nature of Aguirre’s outburst caused him to 
forfeit” the protection of the Act.174
 On remand from the Ninth Circuit, the NLRB ruled that 
Aguirre’s conduct fell short of belligerent, menacing, or physically 
aggressive actions that could cause the employee to lose 
165 Id. at 973. 
166 Id. at 972–73. 




171 Id. at 972. 
172 Id. at 973. 
173 Id.
174 Id.
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protection.175 The Board reasoned that Aguirre’s “you’ll regret it” 
statement was not an express threat of physical violence, but rather 
was ambiguous about consequences, as the pushing of the chair was 
not physically aggressive because he needed to move the chair to 
leave the small room; he had met with his manager to complain 
about terms and conditions of employment; the employer’s interest 
in maintaining order was lowered as this was behind a closed door, 
and Aguirre was provoked by Plaza’s threat of termination.176
 The takeaway from Plaza Auto was that the NLRB, in 
balancing the Atlantic Steel factors, allowed that an employee who 
exceeded the normal boundaries of conduct on one factor could 
be outweighed by the weighting on the other three factors, espe-
cially where management provoked the out of boundary out-
burst.177 Thus, the employee’s conduct, while far from desirable, 
was still protected by the Act.178
B. Pier Sixty, LLC.179: The Board Considers Profanity in the 
Context of Protected Concerted Activities on the Eve of a Union 
Election (2015) 
 Employees at the Pier Sixty event venue were considering 
unionization due to perceived disrespect from supervisors and 
management.180 After a supervisor kept servers from talking during 
work while on break, a server named Perez used his phone and 
posted on Facebook this about a supervisor: “Bob is such a NASTY 
MOTHER FUCKER don’t know how to talk to people!!!!!!! Fuck 
his mother and his entire fucking family!!!! What a LOSER!!!!! 
Vote YES for the UNION!!!!!!!”181 Perez deleted the post after 
the union election.182 The Human Resources Director had seen 
the post, investigated, and then fired Perez as the posts violated 
company policy.183
175 Id. at 974. 
176 Id. at 976–86.
177 Id. at 979. 
178 Id.
179 362 N.L.R.B. 505 (2015) (2–1 decision), enforced, 855 F.3d 115 (2d Cir. 2017). 
180 Pier Sixty, 362 N.L.R.B. at 505.
181 Id.
182 Id. at 506. 
183 Id.
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 While the ALJ found in favor of Perez using the Atlantic
Steel factors, the test used by the NLRB in Pier Sixty to determine if 
the employee’s conduct lost the protection of the Act was a “totality 
of the circumstances” analysis, which the Board found preferable to 
the Atlantic Steel test in light of Perez’s use of social media.184
 Factors weighed by the NLRB in Pier Sixty were: 1) 
whether the record contained any evidence of respondent’s anti-
union hostility, 2) whether the respondent provoked employee’s 
conduct, 3) whether employee’s conduct was impulsive or delib-
erate, 4) the location of employee’s Facebook post, 5) the subject 
matter of the post, 6) the nature of the post, 7) whether respond-
ent considered language similar to the post to be offensive, 8) 
whether respondent maintained a specific rule prohibiting such 
language, 9) whether the discipline imposed was typical of that 
imposed for similar violations—or disproportionate to his of-
fense.185 The Board’s analysis of the factors follows: 
 Factors 1–3: favor the employee.186 Respondent demon-
strated hostility toward union activity.187 Factors 4–5: favor the 
employee.188 He posted comments alone, on break, outside of the 
facility, and did not interrupt the work environment or its rela-
tionship with customers.189 Further, the employee’s comments 
echoed others’ comments.190 Factors 6–7: “the overwhelming ev-
idence established that, while distasteful, the Respondent toler-
ated the widespread use of profanity in the workplace, including 
the words” that Perez used when referring to McSweeney’s fami-
ly.191 Thus, the NLRB held that none of these statements caused 
Perez to lose the protections of the Act.192
 Factors 8–9: Respondent’s “Other Forms of Harassment” 
policy that was cited as a basis for his discharge, neither prohib-
its vulgar or offensive language in general nor did Respondent 
184 Id. at 506 (noting Atlantic Steel factors not well suited to social media 
conduct); cf. Triple Play Sports Bar & Grille, 361 N.L.R.B. 308, 310 (2014). 
185 Pier Sixty, 362 N.L.R.B. at 506.
186 Id.
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allege Perez’s comments were directed at any protected classifi-
cation listed in that policy.193 There had only been five written 
warnings for obscene language, and no discharge based solely on 
such a claim.194 Thus, the Board affirmed the ALJ’s finding in favor 
of Perez.195 Upon appeal to the Court of Appeals for the Second 
Circuit, the appellate court also ruled in favor of Perez, intimat-
ing that Perez’s behavior was on the very edge of protection.196
We ... affirm the NLRB’s determination that Pier Sixty violated 
Sections 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(3) by discharging Hernan Perez since 
Perez’s conduct was not so “opprobrious” as to lose the protec-
tion of the NLRA. Our decision rests heavily on the deference 
afforded to NLRB factual findings, made following a six-day 
bench trial informed by the specific social and cultural context 
in this case. We note, however, that Perez’s conduct sits at the 
outer-bounds of protected, union-related comments.
 The fact that swearing was rampant in the Pier Sixty 
work environment clearly aided Perez’s cause in light of the court’s 
reference to the “social and cultural context.”198 The fact that a 
union election was pending, that management was overtly anti-
union, that Perez was pro-union, that the supervisor was dis-
criminating with respect to enforcement of its rules, and that 
this unfair treatment provoked Perez all weighed in his favor.199
 The takeaway from Pier Sixty is that the NLRB’s “totality 
of the circumstances” test is geared to the fact that often the 
conduct in question is not all taking place at the worksite.200 So-
cial media is a key means of communication among employees in 
the modern world, and abuse of such can be the basis for disci-
pline and discharge.201 Nonetheless, just as with face-to-face 
conduct, employees are entitled to express themselves on social 
media in the context of protected concerted activity, especially 
when provoked by a supervisor.202 The Board will weigh all the 
193 Id. at 507–08. 
194 Id. at 508. 
195 Id.
196 N.L.R.B. v. Pier Sixty, LLC, 855 F.3d 115 (2d Cir. 2017). 
197 Id. at 118. 
198 Id.
199 Id. at 122–24. 
200 Id. at 124–25.
201 Id.
202 Id.
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relevant circumstances in order to determine first, if the employee 
was engaged in protected activity,203 and then whether the em-
ployee’s conduct, in light of the employer’s conduct as well as the 
context, means that the employee loses the protection of the Act.204
C. Cooper Tire & Rubber Co.205: The Board Considers Racist
Remarks and Profanity in the Context of a Picket Line (2016) 
 During a work lockout due to stalled employer-union ne-
gotiations, nonunion and replacement workers performed the 
bargaining unit jobs, crossing over union picket lines.206 Nota-
bly, many of those crossing the picket line to replace the strikers 
were African American.207 As the replacements walked through 
the line, employee Burns yelled: “[g]o home,” “[g]et out of here,” “[g]o 
back where you came from.”208 Employee Runion and one other 
displayed their middle fingers as the vans with replacement 
workers drove past.209 Other picketers yelled, “scab cabs are com-
ing,” “[p]iece of shit,” “[h]ope you get your fucking arm tore off, 
bitch!”210 After other vans passed, Runion yelled, “hey, did you 
bring enough KFC for everyone?” and yet another striker yelled: 
“[g]o back to Africa, you bunch of fucking losers.”211 Thereafter, 
Runion purportedly said: “[h]ey, anybody smell that? I smell fried 
chicken and watermelon.”212 Runion refuted that he made the last 
statements, but the employer concluded that he made them based 
upon a video of the picket line where Runion’s mouth was mov-
ing at the same time that the remark was heard on the tape.213
203 See Quicken Loans, Inc., 367 N.L.R.B. 112, at 1–2 (2019) (Board over-
ruled ALJ and found terminated broker’s conduct was neither concerted nor 
aimed at mutual aid or protection since he was listening to a coworker’s per-
sonal gripes and expressing empathy, and none of it was aimed at Quicken’s 
policies or practices). 
204 Id.
205 Cooper Tire I, 363 N.L.R.B. No. 194 (2016), enforced, 866 F.3d 885 (8th 
Cir. 2017) (3–0 decision affirming the ALJ decision). 
206 Cooper Tire & Rubber Co. v. NLRB (Cooper Tire II), 866 F.3d 885, 889 
(8th Cir. 2017). 
207 Id.
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These statements led to the employee’s discharge, and the em-
ployer stated the termination was based solely on his racially 
charged statements on the picket line.214 The ALJ in Cooper Tire
found that, based upon the evidence, Runion made the remarks 
he denied.215 During this same time, Runion also received a cita-
tion for jaywalking when he walked across the street against the 
light, temporarily impeding progress of another van.216
 Cooper Tire maintained a policy prohibiting unlawful ha-
rassment based upon race, color, religion, sex, age, or national 
origin.217 Its purpose was to outline “the respect to which all Cooper 
employees are entitled as human beings; to work in an environ-
ment free of all forms of harassment and to be treated with dig-
nity, respect and courtesy.”218 Further, the employer’s policy defined 
harassment as “unwelcome comments or conduct relating to race, 
color, religion, sex, age or national origin, which fails to respect the 
dignity and feelings of any Cooper employee.”219 The Cooper Tire 
policy warned violators of discipline, including discharge.220
 In Cooper Tire, the NLRB adopted the standard from 
Clear Pine Mouldings,221 which held that “serious acts of mis-
conduct” during a strike may disqualify a striker from the Act’s 
protection.222 The NLRB in Cooper Tire noted that Clear Pine did 
not say that striker misconduct taking the form of verbal threats 
unaccompanied by physical acts would never result in loss of pro-
tection under the Act.223 The NLRB found that, under the Clear 
Pine standard, Runion’s conduct and statements did not tend to 
coerce or intimidate employees in the exercise of their rights un-
der the Act, nor did they raise a reasonable likelihood of an im-






219 Id. at 4–5.
220 Id. at 5.  
221 Id. at 7 (citing Clear Pine Mouldings, 268 N.L.R.B. 1044 (1984), en-
forced, 765 F.2d 148 (9th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1105 (1986)). 
222 Id. at 7. 
223 Id. at 7. 
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Runion to clear in order for Runion to retain the Act’s protection 
under the Clear Pine standard.224
 The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit upheld the 
NLRB Board’s decision in Cooper Tire, with one member of the 
panel dissenting.225 The appellate court endorsed the Board’s 
use of the Clear Pine standard to determine that Runion’s picket 
line conduct did not cause him to lose the protection of the Act, 
deferring to the Board’s interpretation that Cooper committed 
an unfair labor practice by discharging Runion.226 The majority 
noted that Cooper need not have fired Runion for his harass-
ment pursuant to its Title VII obligations, rather, the employer 
need only take action to end the harassment.227 While Cooper 
Tire thought that the NLRB should have deferred to the arbitra-
tor who found Runion’s statements more serious because they 
occurred on the picket line, rather than in a work context, the 
court found that such a determination was “inconsistent with 
established law.”228 Judge Beam dissented in Cooper Tire, argu-
ing that the arbitrator’s decision was correct and that Runion’s 
racial bigotry should not be protected by the NLRA.229
 The takeaway from Cooper Tire is that the NLRB will apply 
an objective test, outlined in Clear Pine Mouldings, to objectiona-
ble conduct on a picket line.230 The Board recognizes that picket 
lines involve confrontation between union members and employees, 
and that impulsive behavior against non-striking replacements 
is expected.231 If the striker’s conduct and statements do not tend 
to coerce or intimidate employees in the exercise of their rights 
under the Act, nor raise a reasonable likelihood of an imminent 
224 Id. at 7–8. 
225 Cooper Tire II, 866 F.3d 885 (8th Cir. 2017). 
226 Id. at 891, 893. Nonetheless, the court noted its agreement with Judge 
Millett’s concurrence in Consol. Commc’ns, Inc. v. NLRB, 837 F.3d 1, at 20–24 
(D.C. Cir. 2016) (Millett, J., concurring and objecting to Board decisions that 
go too far in forbearance of racially degrading conduct in service to employees’ 
exercise of their statutory rights). Id. at 896. 
227 Id. at 892. 
228 Id. at 894. 
229 Id. at 894–98 (Beam, J., dissenting). 
230 Id. at 889. 
231 Id. (citing, inter alia, Chicago Typographical Union 16, 151 N.L.R.B. 
1666, 1668 (1965) (expecting confrontation); Allied Industrial Workers 289 v. 
NLRB, 476 F.2d 868, 879 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (noting impulsivity to be expected 
on picket line)). 
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physical confrontation, the conduct may remain protected by the 
NLRA, according to the court in Cooper Tire, following the Board’s 
Clear Pine Mouldings test.232
VI. ANALYSIS OF THE APPLICATION OF THE THEN EXISTING RULES
AND THE NLRB’S ANNOUNCEMENT TO APPLY THE WRIGHT LINE
RULE IN GENERAL MOTORS AND THE IMPLICATIONS
 In 2017, the then newly appointed233 NLRB General Counsel 
Peter B. Robb, issued a Memorandum,234 which provided priori-
ties of the new administration. Specifically, he provided a list of 
significant legal issues that, if contained within yet to be decided 
cases, must be submitted to the NLRB Division of Advice.235 He 
identified those as cases that overruled precedent, involved one 
or more dissents, and so forth.236 The General Counsel specifically 
cited Cooper Tire and Pier Sixty, writing:
[e]xamples of Board decisions that might support issuance of 
complaint, but where we also might want to provide the Board 
with an alternative analysis, include: ... Conflicts with other 
statutory requirements [(a)] finding racist comments by pick-
eters protected ... because they were not direct threats (Cooper 
Tire) ... [and (b)] finding social media postings protected even 
though employee’s conduct could violate EEO principles (e.g., 
Pier Sixty).237
 Shortly after the GC Memorandum, the standard for addres-
sing facially neutral work rules changed with the Boeing case, 
thus allowing employers more leeway to install rules relating to 
civility and other legitimate management concerns.238 In a joint 
232 Cooper Tire II, 866 F.3d at 889–90. 
233 General Counsel Peter B. Robb was confirmed on Nov. 17, 2017 for a 
four-year term. See NLRB, About General Counsel, https://nlrb.gov/bio/gen 
eral-counsel [https://perma.cc/M3JF-NAU3]. 
234 Memorandum from the NLRB Office of the General Counsel, Mandatory 
Submissions to Advice, Memorandum GC 18-02 (Dec. 1, 2017), https://www 
.employerlaborrelations.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/220/2017/12/GC-18-man 
datory-advice.pdf [https://perma.cc/X9AQ-M8KK] [hereinafter GC Memorandum]. 
235 Id. at 1.  
236 Id.
237 Id. at 2–3. 
238 Lauren S. Novak, NLRB General Counsel Issues New Guidance for 
Workplace Rules, NAT’L L. REV. (June 21, 2018), https://www.natlawreview.com 
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interview with General Counsel Peter Robb, and John Ring, Chair-
man of the NLRB, the General Counsel once again brought up 
the issue of the “perceived conflict ... between the NLRB and the 
EEOC’s interpretations of employer civility rules, workplace pol-
icies that generally call on employees to be respectful of one an-
other.”239 In particular, the General Counsel focused on Cooper Tire
and noted that he “very much disagrees” with the Board’s decision 
in that case, but will continue to follow existing law until he could 
“get a case up to the board sometime before too long to let them 
opine on that issue.”240 Thus, the General Counsel pronounced that 
he was looking for a case to provide an alternative analysis than 
that used by the Board in both Pier Sixty and Cooper Tire.241
 It is no wonder that the result in Cooper Tire raised the 
ire of President Trump’s appointee as General Counsel of the 
NLRB, as well as others on the employer side of labor relations.242
Why should employers have to retain employees who make such 
insulting, stereotypical, racial remarks that could create liability 
for the employer under equal employment opportunity laws? 
While Cooper Tire appears to be the case involving the most ob-
jectionable statements, in that they are illustrative of employee 
racism, a critical fact that differentiates the misconduct in 
Cooper Tire from other misconduct cases is that Runion’s re-
marks took place in the context of an employer lockout.243 Runion 
was a locked-out employee walking the picket line, and, after 
watching replacement workers safely driven across the line in 
vans to do the work, he made the admittedly offensive remarks 
that the employer asserted as the reason for his discharge.244
 A lockout is a preemptive move by an employer that has 
reached an impasse in bargaining with a union, such that it locks 
out employees before they have the chance to withhold their labor 
/article/nlrb-general-counsel-issues-new-guidance-workplace-rules [https://perma 
.cc/VWF7-JY5C].
239 Vin Gurrieri, NLRB Mulling an Expanded Role For Rulemaking In 
2019, LAW360, at 4 (Jan. 1, 2019), https://www.law360.com/articles/1114155 
[https://perma.cc/5CCG-LBYX]. 
240 Id.
241 Opfer & Iafolla, supra note 160.  
242 Vin Gurrieri, DC Circ. Tells NLRB To Assess ‘Conflict’ In Labor, EEO 
Laws, LAW360 (Jan. 2, 2020), https://www.law360.com/articles/1230784/dc 
-circ-tells-nlrb-to-assess-conflict-in-labor-eeo-laws [https://perma.cc/5MAJ-A823]. 
243 Cooper Tire & Rubber Co., 363 N.L.R.B. No. 194, at 9 (May 17, 2016).  
244 Cooper Tire, 866 F.3d at 889. 
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in a strike and thus the employer controls the plan, and replaces 
the workers on its own terms.245 While a lockout is not an unfair 
labor practice per se, it does indicate that Cooper Tire was willing 
to engage in its own economic pressure tactics to defeat the ex-
isting bargaining unit’s attempt to make gains through collective 
bargaining. Even in a bargaining unit approved a strike, strikers 
seek to use their economic power to influence collective bargaining 
in their favor.246 They put themselves on the picket line and those 
who cross that line to perform the struck work undermine the 
efficacy of the strike and the picketers’ position. People crossing 
a picket line generally would not expect either respect or gracious 
treatment from strikers, because those crossing the line are classi-
fied traitors or scabs by the striking employees and the union that 
represents them.247 That said, both the union and the employer, in 
the context of a labor dispute, retain an obligation to protect equal 
employment opportunity rights of both employees and strikers, 
including the obligation to prevent a hostile work environment.248
 Another factor that protected Runion in Cooper Tire was 
the employer’s imposition of discriminatory discipline.249 Runion 
was not rehired when the strike was over, but other picketers 
who made racially offensive remarks were not discharged like 
Runion.250 The NLRB General Counsel noted that another em-
ployee who was African American called his supervisor a “dumb 
white hillbilly asshole” but his punishment was suspension, not 
discharge as in Runion’s case.251 So, despite an employer policy 
prohibiting racist remarks, a similar situation involving profanity 
and disrespect did not bring the severe discipline imposed on 
Runion in Cooper Tire.252 Arguably, Runion’s fried chicken and 
245 See DAVID P. TWOMEY & STEPHANIE GREENE, LABOR & EMPLOYMENT 
LAW 790 (16th ed. 2020) (defining lockout as “economic pressure tactic of an 
employer during negotiations which consists of withholding of work, and which 
also may be an illegal attempt to discourage union activity”). 
246 NLRB, BASIC GUIDE TO THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATION ACT 10 (1997). 
247 DAVID P. TWOMEY, LABOR & EMPLOYMENT LAW 773 (14th ed. 2010). 
248 NLRB, BASIC GUIDE TO THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATION ACT 19 (1997). 
249 Cooper Tire I, 363 N.L.R.B. No. 194, at 5 (May 17, 2016). 
250 Id.
251 Id. at 6; see also Christine Neylon O’Brien, I Swear! From Shoptalk to 
Social Media: The Top Ten National Labor Relations Board Profanity Cases,
90 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 53, at 79–80 (discussing the basis for the ALJ’s Decision 
in Cooper Tire).
252 Cooper Tire I, 363 N.L.R.B., slip op. at 6.  
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watermelon remark to a strikebreaker was less opprobrious than 
the “dumb white hillbilly asshole” remark to a supervisor that did 
not result in discharge. And, as the appellate court noted, “[w]hile 
yelling, Runion’s hands were in his pockets; he made no overt 
physical movements or gestures .... [and] [t]here [was] no evi-
dence the replacement workers heard Runion’s statements.”253
Thus, using the second part of the Board’s Clear Pine criteria, 
Runion did not raise a reasonable likelihood of imminent con-
frontation.254 The replacements were well across the picket line 
and contained in vans at the time of Runion’s remarks.255
 The NLRB stated in Triple Play Sports Bar & Grille that 
the Atlantic Steel framework should not apply to “employees’ off-
duty, offsite” communications because Atlantic Steel “applies to 
employee misconduct in the workplace.”256 In Cooper Tire, the 
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit extended this interpreta-
tion to disqualify the use of Atlantic Steel’s balancing test to picket 
line misconduct, instead allowing the Board’s application of its own 
picket line precedents that provide employees more protection 
than they “would enjoy in the normal course of employment.”257
 The picket line at Cooper Tire was a situation where pro-
fanity and slurs occurred and, to some extent, were expected and 
tolerated.258 Even if the Atlantic Steel test were applied to Run-
ion’s conduct, albeit with a proviso that the picket line affords 
more protection for misconduct than on the work floor, arguably, 
Runion’s conduct could still have been protected. On the factors 
from Atlantic Steel: 1) the location of the discussion was a picket 
line,259 and this factor would weigh in favor of protection for the 
conduct, in that picketing is protected concerted activity, and, in 
fact, more leeway should be allowed there than on the work floor;260
2) the subject matter of the discussion was somewhat related to 
protected concerted activity, i.e., picketing to protest a lock-
out/strike, and the profane and offensive remarks were directed 
253 Cooper Tire II, 866 F.3d at 889. 
254 Id.
255 Cooper Tire I, 363 N.L.R.B., slip op. at 4. 
256 Cooper Tire II, 866 F.3d at 893–94 (citing Triple Play Sports Bar & Grille, 
361 N.L.R.B. 32, 34 (2014)). 
257 Id. (citing Consol. Comm’ns, Inc. v. NLRB, 837 F.3d 1, 20–24 (D.C. Cir. 
2016)). 
258 Id. at 889.
259 Id. at 894.
260 See Atl. Steel Co., 245 N.L.R.B. 814, 816–17 (1979). 
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at those who were undermining the strike,261 thus one could argue 
that this factor weighed in favor of protection because the pro-
fanity was designed to discourage strikebreakers and improve the 
strikers’ chance of success;262 3) the nature of Runion’s outburst 
involved profanity and offensive remarks,263 which would weigh 
against protection, however, if profanity was a normal part of 
what went on at the picket line, and it related to protected con-
certed activity, one could argue that on balance, unless the remarks 
exceeded the leeway granted to other strikers and strikebreak-
ers, then the nature of the outburst factor would weigh in favor 
of protection;264 and regarding 4) whether the outburst was pro-
voked by the employer’s unfair labor practices, one could argue 
that the outburst was not provoked by an actual unfair labor 
practice, however, it was provoked by employer economic pres-
sure and the presence of replacement workers.265 Thus, this last 
factor from Atlantic Steel would weigh against protection. All 
things considered, if the Atlantic Steel test were applied to Cooper 
Tire, and the Board weighed the four factors, Runion’s conduct 
could also be protected, as two factors clearly weigh in his favor, 
one arguably weighs in his favor, and only one against, but even 
there, there are ameliorating facts.266
 This is not to say that the outcome in Cooper Tire, em-
ployees swearing at members of a different race or gender, and 
alluding to their target’s inborn legally protected characteristics, 
was a model scenario. However, just as in Plaza Auto, and Pier
Sixty,267 the social and cultural environment that the employer 
creates or tolerates is part of the picture when the Board evalu-
ates if the remarks were so opprobrious as to result in loss of 
protection under the NLRA.268
 One of Cooper Tires’ arguments was that it had recently been 
forced to pay off a harassment claim, and thus it was sensitive to 
the need to eliminate racially harassing behavior like Runion’s.269
261 Cooper Tire I, 866 F.3d at 891.
262 See Atl. Steel Co., 245 N.L.R.B. at 816.  
263 Cooper Tire I, 866 F.3d at 890.
264 See Atl. Steel Co., 245 N.L.R.B. at 816–17. 
265 Cooper Tire I, 866 F.3d at 889.
266 Id.
267 See Pier Sixty LLC, 362 N.L.R.B. 505, 506 (2015). 
268 Id. at 506.
269 Cooper Tire I, 866 F.3d at 892. 
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Notably, the Eighth Circuit found that “Runion’s comments—
even if they had been made in the workplace instead of on the 
picket line—did not create a hostile work environment.”270 Em-
ployees have the right to engage in protected concerted activity 
under the Act, and thus employer restrictions on language on a 
picket line should be carefully outlined so as not to infringe on that 
activity in a fashion that discriminates based upon union activity. 
 A straightforward solution to the quandary that employers 
find themselves in when trying to prevent violating employees’ labor 
law rights where they fear a conflict with equal employment op-
portunity laws goes back to the application of fair and evenhanded 
discipline. A commonsense approach would be to apply traditional 
progressive discipline to employees who make or write comments 
that infringe on equal employment opportunity rights, even if those 
comments might be within the context of otherwise protected ac-
tivity. An employer could create a policy or work rule that outlines 
prohibited words or gestures and outlines progressive discipline 
for such violations. In order to eliminate allegations of discrimi-
natory discipline based upon a termination at the first violation, 
employers should start with an oral, and then a written warning, 
then a suspension if infraction of rules persists, and finally ter-
minate after the individual commits the misconduct one more time 
under the last chance rule. A legitimate disciplinary framework 
that gives specific examples of what conduct will, or will not, be 
tolerated, as well as a series of penalties that are just, would put 
all employees on notice of the consequences of making insulting 
and degrading remarks that impact protected characteristics. 
 In a very recent case from the Court of Appeals for the 
Eighth Circuit, Bazemore, a black woman, sued Best Buy because 
of a white worker’s “racist and sexually charged joke” in the 
presence of a small group of employees at work.271 The company 
chose to issue a final written warning to the offending employee 
rather than fire her.272 The appellate panel upheld the compa-
ny’s action, finding that the retail chain store took measures 
short of firing the offender to curtail her inappropriate behavior 
270 Id. (citing Smith v. Fairview Ridges Hosp., 625 F.3d 1076, 1085 (8th Cir. 
2010) (regarding similar comments to Runion’s)). 
271 Bazemore v. Best Buy, 2020 U.S. App. LEXIS 12764, at *1–2 (4th Cir. 
April 21, 2020). 
272 Id. at *3–4. A final written warning is the last step in Best Buy’s disci-
plinary process before it fires an employee. Id. at *4–5. 
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as soon as the company was aware of it.273 The court found that 
the unwelcome conduct was not imputable to the employer as 
the party who made the remark was a co-worker, not a supervisor 
of the complainant, Ms. Bazemore, and the employer acted promptly 
to address the issue.274 The appellate court noted, “Title VII does 
not prescribe specific action for an employer to take in response 
to racial or sexual harassment, or require that the harasser be 
fired.”275 The court found that Best Buy took action “reasonably 
calculated” to stop the harassment and that the employer had it 
within their discretion to decide upon the “exact disciplinary ac-
tions.”276 This Best Buy decision did not involve NLRA-protected 
concerted activity, but while speaking to the issue of an employ-
er’s duty to prevent a hostile work environment, the court high-
lighted the disciplinary discretion that employers retain when 
responding to potential Title VII violations.277
 Legal advisors to businesses frequently choose to err on 
the side of preventing equal employment opportunity violations 
rather than worrying about potential violations of the NLRA.278
This is because the costs for violations under the NLRA are far 
less than the costs of remedies under Title VII, as the latter in-
cludes make-whole and punitive damages.279 The GM NLRB ma-
jority signaled their intent to reconsider Obama-era decisions in 
this area when they sought input in the General Motors case, and 
are likely to “make it easier for employers to part ways with work-
ers who make offensive statements.”280 At the time the NLRB 
273 Id. at *1–5. 
274 Id. at *8–9. 
275 Id. at *9. 
276 Id. at *9–12. The court noted that Best Buy’s actions to address the 
harassment did in fact end it. Id. at *12. 
277 Id. at *12.
278 See Braden Campbell, EEOC Trumps NLRB on Worker Speech Concerns,
LAW360 (Nov. 19, 2019), https://www.law360.com/articles/1221470 [https:// 
perma.cc/3FYZ-QRBE] (citing commentary and a quotation from management 
advisor Eric Meyer of FisherBroyles LLP). 
279 Id.
280 Id. (quoting Leigh Tyson, from management-side Constangy Brooks 
Smith & Prophete LLP). The Board was then comprised of three Republican 
members. See The Board, NLRB, https://www.nlrb.gov/about-nlrb/who-we-are 
/the-board [https://perma.cc/E5SF-GU26], and Members of the Board Since 1935, 
https://www.nlrb.gov/about-nlrb/who-we-are/board/members-nlrb-1935 [https:// 
perma.cc/HT5H-4VLF] (detailing political party affiliations of NLRB members, 
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sought amicus input in the GM case, it was composed of all Re-
publican appointees for the first time in eighty-five years, as the 
Economic Policy Institute pointed out upon the expiration of Demo-
crat Lauren McFerran’s term in December 2019.281 The NLRB’s 
current General Counsel, Peter Robb, went on the record that he 
“very much disagrees” with the Board’s 2016 Cooper Tire & 
Rubber Company decision where the agency ordered the company 
to rehire a worker who made racist comments while on a picket 
line.282 It was no surprise that the NLRB’s then three-man 
Board,283 as prodded by General Counsel Robb, would further re-
strict profanity and offensive behavior, whether face-to-face, on 
social media, or on a picket line. Yet this restriction was not neces-
sary, especially when taking into account the industrial realities 
that the U.S. Supreme Court pronounced as the NLRB’s role.284
 The NLRB’s choice of the General Motors case for reconsider-
ation of this issue was interesting. It is difficult for an average 
observer to find much sympathy for employee/union representa-
tive Charles Robinson when reading the facts.285 The NLRB ALJ 
did not credit Robinson’s testimony concerning the happenings 
leading up to his numerous suspensions and his own conduct at 
a management meeting.286 Robinson’s conduct was scornful of 
individual supervisors, including profanity directed at one in partic-
ular, Stevens, whom he sought to exclude from one meeting.287
including dates of appointment and expiration. Current Chairman Ring, and 
Members Emanuel and Kaplan are all Republican appointees). Democratic 
Member McFerran’s term expired on Dec. 16, 2019. Member McFerran was 
the lone dissenter to the Board majority’s request for feedback in the General 
Motors case. Members McFerran and Kaplan were reappointed in late July, 
2020. See supra note 98 discussing NLRB membership and reappointments. 
281 See Lynn Rhinehart & Celine McNicholas, Three Republican-appointed 
white men are now deciding whether you have rights on the job, THE ECON. POL’Y
INST. (Dec. 17, 2019), https://www.epi.org/blog/three-republican-appointed-white     
-men-are-now-deciding-whether-you-have-rights-on-the-job/ [https://perma.cc 
/64S5-ESNK].
282 See Gurrieri, supra note 239. 
283 Based on the then Republican NLRB composition, there was no possi-
bility of dissent by a Democratic member. 
284 NLRB v. J. Weingarten, Inc., 420 U.S. 251 (1975). “The responsibility to 
adapt the Act to changing patterns of industrial life is entrusted to the Board.” 
Id. at 266. 
285 Id. at 254–56.  
286 Gen. Motors II, 368 N.L.R.B. No. 68, slip op. at 1 (Sept. 5, 2019). 
287 Id.
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While Robinson functioned as a union steward, his role included 
engaging in protected concerted activity for the benefit of em-
ployees he represented.288
 The role of a union steward at GM should not indemnify 
Robinson from suspension or even job loss where he egregiously 
abused others, including supervisors; instigated disruption in 
meetings by playing contentious music laced with profanity and 
racially antagonistic remarks, and lied about it under oath at a 
hearing; or in other ways sought to unduly interfere with legiti-
mate employer objectives.289 The fourth factor in the Atlantic Steel 
test looks to see if there was an unfair labor practice that pro-
voked the employee’s outburst.290 Arguably, since the employer’s 
first suspension of Robinson (regarding the April 11th meeting) 
was not lawful, as the ALJ later found it was an employer unfair 
labor practice, this set the scene for Robinson’s subsequent bad 
attitude towards management and may have impacted his mis-
conduct at the April 25th meeting which was proximate in time.291
However, two weeks had passed in the interim before the second 
meeting and thus, one might imagine that Robinson would have 
calmed down somewhat. The third such meeting that resulted in 
Robinson’s third suspension took place on October 6th of the same 
year, nearly six months after the first meeting, and thus was not 
proximate in time to the unfair labor practice following the April 
11th meeting, and the ALJ found that Robinson’s conduct in the 
October meeting was not provoked by an unfair labor practice.292
It seemed highly unlikely that Robinson would have any more 
luck at the NLRB than he did with the ALJ. The ALJ found that 
two of General Motors’ suspensions of Robinson were warranted, 
using the Atlantic Steel test and that only the first suspension 
involved an unfair labor practice.293 In the first incident, Robin-
son was representing the interests of bargaining unit members 
regarding overtime pay, and the ALJ ruled that Robinson’s con-
duct was “not as egregious” as that in Plaza Auto, concluding 
that Robinson’s outburst did not lose the protection of the Act.294
288 Id.
289 Id.
290 Atl. Steel Co., 245 N.L.R.B. 814, 816 (1979).  
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A. The General Motors Decision—2020 
 As this Article went to press, the NLRB decided the Gen-
eral Motors case.295 The three Republican appointees, Chairman 
Ring and Members Kaplan and Emanuel, voted unanimously to 
discard the NLRB’s three context-related standards for loss of 
the NLRA’s protection of concerted activity due to profane and 
offensive workplace outbursts, social media posts, and picket 
lines.296 The Board held that henceforth all such cases should be 
analyzed using the Board’s forty-year-old Wright Line rule.297
This stalwart burden-shifting standard requires the NLRB’s 
General Counsel to make a prima facie case that the employee 
was engaged in Section 7 activity, which the employer knew about, 
and that the employer’s animus to the protected concerted activity 
motivated discipline of the employee.298 Thereafter, where the 
employer contends the discipline was motivated by the employ-
ee’s abusive conduct, the burden shifts to the employer to per-
suade that the employer would have executed the discipline even 
absent the Section 7 activity.299 Further, the Board’s holding in 
General Motors starkly declared that “[w]e overrule all pertinent 
cases to the extent they are inconsistent with this holding.”300
The Board in General Motors summarized the positions of 
various amici and then adopted the position of the Respondent 
employer that the Board should drop its setting-specific stan-
dards.301 The GM Board criticized those standards, noting that the 
Atlantic Steel four-factor analysis of abusive conduct in the course of 
otherwise protected workplace conversations has produced incon-
sistent outcomes.302 The Board objected that the second Atlantic
295 Gen. Motors LLC (Gen. Motors III), 369 N.L.R.B. No. 127, slip op. at 1 
(July 21, 2020). 
296 Id.
297 Id. (citing Wright Line, 251 N.L.R.B. 1083 (1980)), NLRB v. Wright 
Line, 662 F.2d 899 (1st Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 989 (1982) (approved 
in NLRB v. Transp. Mgmt. Corp., 462 U.S. 393 (1983)). 
298 Id. at 2 n.9 (citing Tschiggfrie Properties, Ltd., 368 N.L.R.B. No. 120, 
slip op. at 6, 8 (2019)). 
299 Id. at 2 n.10 (citing Hobson Bearing Int’l, Inc., 365 N.L.R.B. No. 73, slip 
op. at 1 n.1 (2017)). 
300 Id. at 2. The GM Board repeated this proclamation later in its opinion. 
Id. at 9, 9 n.22. 
301 Id. at 4. 
302 Id. at 6. 
210 WILLIAM & MARY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 12:167 
Steel factor, the subject matter of the outburst, always favored 
employees since the test only applied when the discussion in-
volved Section 7 activity, and that the Board gave “little, if any, 
consideration to [an] employer’s right to maintain order and re-
spect.”303 The GM Board concluded that the Atlantic Steel analy-
sis was not effective, that the Board had not sufficiently explained 
the test’s application to various facts, creating an analysis that 
serves as “a cloak for agency whim.”304
 With respect to the previously adopted totality of the cir-
cumstances test for social media posts and coworker discussions, 
the GM Board found more flexibility on factors to be considered 
than with the Atlantic Steel test, which only leaned itself to the 
same problems of inconsistency and unpredictability it noted with 
respect to the Atlantic Steel four-factor test.305 Finally, the GM
Board determined that use of the Clear Pine test for picket line mis-
conduct left the bar too low because it only results in loss of NLRA 
protection where the conduct involved “an overt or implied threat or 
where there is a reasonable likelihood of an imminent physical 
confrontation.”306 This test left “appallingly abusive picket-line 
misconduct to retain protection, including racially and sexually 
offensive language.”307 The GM Board also faulted the setting-
specific standards as creating tension with equal employment op-
portunity laws designed to avoid harm rather than redress it.308
 Chairman Ring penned an opinion piece for the Wall Street 
Journal one day after the Board issued its decision in General 
Motors.309 In justifying the agency’s reversal of “Obama-era 
standards that forced employers to reinstate abusive employees,” 
the NLRB Chairman noted several comments made on the picket 
303 Id. at 5 (citing NLRB v. Starbucks Coffee Co., 679 F.3d 79, 73–74, 79–80 
(2d Cir. 2012) (noting circuit court faulted NLRB for improperly disregarding the 
employer’s legitimate concern about employee swearing in front of customers)).  
304 Id. at 6 (citing LeMoyne-Owen  v. NLRB, 357 F.3d 55, 61 (D.C. Cir. 
2004)). 
305 Id.
306 Id. at 10. 
307 Id. (citing Cooper I, 363 N.L.R.B. No. 194, slip op. at 7–10 (2016)). 
308 Id. at 11 (citing Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 806 (1998)). 
309 John F. Ring, NLRB Stops Excusing Workplace Harassment, WALL ST.
J. (July 21, 2020, 3:11 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/nlrb-stops-excusing 
-workplace-harassment-11595358659 [https://perma.cc/9DAG-BA7K]. 
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line in Cooper Tire.310 He chose not to clarify that the worst rac-
ist statement, “Go back to Africa” was not made by the employee 
who was terminated and sought relief under the rights and pro-
tections of the NLRA.311 Rather, that comment was part of the 
scene.312 The comment actually attributed to that employee was 
“I smell fried chicken and watermelon.”313 This racial inference 
to diet was clearly less hostile than the former offensive slur 
that the employee in question did not make. This does not ex-
cuse the latter comment, but it lessened the egregiousness in 
that it was singular and less confrontational.
 In the same opinion piece, Chairman Ring declared: “the 
NLRB is now out of the business of deciding whether bad behav-
ior is ‘bad enough.’”314 Yet the imposition of the Wright Line
standard adopted by the GM Board still requires the Board to 
judge just what misconduct is sufficient to provide an employer 
defense that the employee would have been fired anyway, absent 
the NLRA-protected activity.315 The Chairman cast the GM de-
cision as “an important advancement for civility and respect in 
this country’s workplaces.”316 Make no mistake; the GM decision 
is also an advancement for management rights to stifle objection 
to the status quo. It further restrains employee rights to engage 
in protected concerted activity to seek improvement in wages, 
hours, and working conditions.317 The decision makes it easier for 
employers to parse their need to protect employees from a hos-
tile work environment as a reason to discharge union support-
ers.318 Interestingly, when Cooper Tire appealed to the Court of 
310 Id.
311 Cooper Tire II, 866 F.3d 885, 895 (8th Cir. 2017). 
312 Id.
313 See Ring, supra note 309. 
314 Id.
315 Gen. Motors III, 369 N.L.R.B. No. 127, slip op. at 2 (July 21, 2020). 
316 See Ring, supra note 309.
317 Braden Campbell, NLRB Makes it Easier to Fire Workers over Profane 
Outbursts, LAW360 (July 21, 2020, 2:32 PM), https://www.law360.com/arti 
cles/1294083/nlrb-makes-it-easier-to-fire-workers-over-profane-outbursts [https:// 
perma.cc/ASB8-27FD] (noting under new standard adopted in General Motors
decision, employer gets a chance to prove it would have fired the worker anyway 
even absent the protected conduct).  
318 Id.
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Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, the court ruled that the employ-
ee’s comment/conduct on the picket line did not create a hostile 
work environment.319
 Perhaps one positive thing about the GM Board’s pro-
nouncement implementing the Wright Line test henceforth is 
that it is simpler than having three setting-based tests. That said, 
the setting or context should still matter under the Wright Line test.
Where discriminatory discipline occurs in reaction to the exer-
cise of protected concerted activity, this should give rise to an 
unfair labor practice finding unless the misconduct was so egre-
gious that the employee would have been fired anyway. The con-
text matters as well as the conduct of all employees and managers, 
or replacement workers in the case of a picket line.320 It is the 
nature of a picket line that tempers will flare when picketing locked 
out employees are confronted with replacement workers crossing 
the line to perform what picketers perceive as “their” work. If a 
boss is bullying an employee or swearing at him/her, the em-
ployee is more likely to retaliate in kind. And if the same occurs on 
social media, retorts to derogatory or defamatory remarks from oth-
ers are likely to be met in kind. The GM Board specifically dis-
counted earlier Board precedent recognizing “that disputes over 
wages, hours, and working conditions are among the disputes 
most likely to engender ill feelings and strong responses.”321 The 
Board in GM wrote that “this rationale is overstated and has 
largely swallowed employers’ concomitant right to maintain order, 
respect, and a workplace free from invidious discrimination.”322
The GM Board qualified that this perspective was limited to 
cases where there was no discriminatory discipline.323
 The GM Board objected to the setting-specific standards 
because they worried that these standards did not require the 
Board to establish anti-union motivation, but rather presumed or 
inferred it in the face of discrimination against a union supporter.324
Such discrimination takes the form of harsher discipline imposed 
319 Id. (citing Cooper Tire II, 866 F.3d 885, 892 (8th Cir. 2017)). 
320 Gen. Motors LLC (Gen. Motors III), 369 N.L.R.B. No. 127, slip op. at 19 
(July 21, 2020). 
321 Id. at 2 (quoting Consumer Power Co., 282 N.L.R.B. 130, 132 (1986)). 
322 Id.
323 Id.
324 Id. at 14. 
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on a union supporter than another in similar circumstances. It is 
interesting that the Board, in applying the “totality of the cir-
cumstances” test in Pier Sixty, set out evidence of employer anti-
union activity as the second factor.325 The GM Board discounted 
the Board’s earlier pronouncements that “[w]here an employer 
defends disciplinary action based on employee conduct that is 
part of the res gestae of the employee’s protected activity, Wright
Line is inapplicable.”326 The GM Board disagreed with this, set-
ting out that the causal connection between the protected activity 
and the discipline was, in fact, “properly in dispute.”327 In some 
respects, it seems that the GM Board feared that with the set-
ting-specific standards, employers might be held to the same stan-
dards as employees with respect to profane or offensive conduct.328
They shudder at an employee’s use of profanity towards man-
agement in Plaza Auto,329 or NLRB v. Starbucks, 330 a slur at a 
strikebreaker in Cooper Tire, 331 but illustrate no similar outrage at 
the profanity directed at employees by managers on the eve of a 
union election in Pier Sixty.332
 In its parting shot, the GM Board decided to apply the 
Wright Line standard retroactively to pending cases relating to 
abusive conduct in connection with Section 7 protected activity.333
The Board acknowledged that some employees might have acted 
in reliance on the prior setting-specific standards and engaged in 
conduct [that would no longer be protected] but managed to find 
that such “ill effects are outweighed by the potential harm of 
producing results contrary to the Act’s principles and potentially
325 See supra notes 185–99 and accompanying text discussing factors in 
Pier Sixty.
326 Gen. Motors III, 369 N.L.R.B., slip op. at 15 (citing Roemer Indus. Inc., 
362 N.L.R.B. 828, 834 n.15 (2015)). The quote from Roemer continued to say: 
“This is so because the causal connection between the protected activity and 
the discipline is not in dispute.” Id.
327 Id.
328 See id. 
329 Id. at 19 n.1 (outlining employee’s profanity at Plaza’s owner over alleged 
improper calculation of sales commissions). 
330 Id. at 9 (citing NLRB v. Starbucks Coffee Co., 679 F.3d 70, 73–74, 79–80 
(2d Cir. 2012)) (concerning off-duty employee swearing at a manager). 
331 Id. at 19 n.3. 
332 Id. at 19 n.2 (citing only the swearing directed at manager). 
333 Id. at 17. 
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at odds with antidiscrimination law.”334 Once again, the GM Board 
leans towards protecting management at the expense of employ-
ee rights.335 Thus, cases that are in the pipeline or on remand to 
the Board, or to an ALJ, will require reconsideration and likely 
development of additional facts under the newly announced and 
yet retroactive forty-year-old Wright Line rule.336 It is unlikely 
that employees will fare better under the GM Board’s old/new 
standard rather than with the prior rules. 
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
 There is not unbounded protection on speech and conduct 
just because of the Section 7 concerted activity involved.337 This 
was never the case.338 There were always limits on NLRA pro-
tected acts, and the context of the remarks or conduct should be 
part of the Board’s analysis,339 as well as the impact on other 
334 Id. (emphasis added). 
335 Id.
336 Id. at 1.
337 Id. at 13. 
338 Id. at 12. 
339 Babb v. Wilkie, No. 18-882, slip op. at 1 (Apr. 6, 2020). Chief Justice 
Roberts spoke up at President Trump’s impeachment trial before the Senate 
on Jan. 22, 2020 about the need for civility amongst advocates in the U.S. 
Supreme Court forum: 
I think it is appropriate at this point for me to admonish both 
the House managers and the president’s counsel in equal terms 
to remember that they are addressing the world’s greatest de-
liberative body. One reason it has earned that title is because 
its members avoid speaking in a manner and using language 
that is not conducive to civil discourse. In the 1905 Swayne trial, 
a senator objected when one of the managers used the word 
‘pettifogging,’ [referring to Judge Charles Swayne who was 
impeached and later acquitted by the Senate] and the presiding 
officer said the word ought not to have been used. I don’t think we 
need to aspire to that high a standard, but I do think those ad-
dressing the Senate should remember where they are. 
NBC News (@NBCNews), TWITTER (Jan. 22, 2020, 12:59 AM), https://twitter 
.com/NBCNews/status/1219862246731501568. Further, at the oral argument 
for Babb v. Wilkie (Case. No. 18-882) Chief Justice Roberts recently expressed 
concern when a plaintiff in an age discrimination case before the Court was 
using a hypothetical where an employer said “OK, Boomer” during a job ap-
plication process, and pondered whether the plaintiff’s position was “going to 
become really just a regulation of speech in the workplace.” See Jimmy Hoover, 
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employees and on employers who are responsible for a work-
place free from harassment. Both the union and the employer, in 
the context of a labor dispute, retain an obligation to protect equal 
employment opportunity rights of both employees and strikers, in-
cluding the obligation to prevent a hostile work environment.340
 In the post-GM labor law world, employers should set up 
rules that make clear that there will be progressive discipline for 
profanity and offensive conduct that conflicts with employee rights 
under equal employment opportunity law. This is necessary for 
the good of all, employers, unions, and employees.341 Employers 
should not be placed in a catch twenty-two situation where they 
are subject to suit for unfair labor practices under the NLRA and 
Title VII and other EEO violations that can be pursued by agencies, 
unions, and employees.342 Discipline need not be draconian to 
achieve the objective of eliminating harassing behavior. It does 
not have to mean discharge or even suspension upon the first 
offense.343 Progressive discipline works, employees learn what 
conduct and language is impermissible, and employer civility rules 
can put supervisors on notice what provoking conduct on the part 
Roberts Wonders if Workers Can Sue Over ‘OK, Boomer,’ LAW360 (Jan. 15, 
2020, 1:30 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1234662/roberts-wonders-if 
-workers-can-sue-over-ok-boomer- [https://perma.cc/26WH-3GJA]. Interestingly, 
the Supreme Court voted 8–1 in favor of the employee, ruling that he only needed 
to prove that age was a motivating factor in order to be able to sue, and eschewed a 
‘but for’ standard of causation in cases of discrimination in federal employment 
cases. Babb v. Wilkie, No. 18-882, slip op. at 1 (Apr. 6, 2020). The ‘but for’ cause 
would still be required for a remedy. Id. at 14. There are currently a number of 
regulations for speech in the workplace built into the language of equal em-
ployment opportunity, labor, tort laws relating to workplace violence, defamation, 
and trade secret protection, among others. See Lisa Nagele-Piazza, What Em-




340 See generally supra text accompanying notes 257–70. 
341 See supra Part VI. 
342 Of course, many employees are subject to mandatory individual arbi-
tration agreements which effectively remove these disputes from the public 
forum of an Article III court, in favor of private resolution by arbitrators. 
343 See Progressive Discipline Policy—Single Progressive Discipline Policy,
SHRM, https://www.shrm.org/resourcesandtools/tools-and-samples/policies/pages 
/progressivedisciplinepolicy.aspx [https://perma.cc/RGT8-G2UX] (setting out 
progressive discipline of oral warning, written warning, suspension with final 
written warning and then termination). 
216 WILLIAM & MARY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 12:167 
of the supervisor could excuse an employee’s profane outburst.344
Regardless of the current NLRB’s excessive concern for manage-
ment rights, what is good for the employee in terms of limits on 
profanity and offensive speech should be good for her boss as well. 
 Employers could use categories of words, outlined in an 
employer manual, if the employer wishes to regulate civility, 
much like comedian George Carlin wrote a monologue “Seven 
Words You Can Never Say on Television.”345 There is a difference 
between rude statements and hate speech. The latter should 
have severe consequences, but the former may not even be ac-
tionable if emitted by a supervisor to an employee without refer-
ence to a protected category such as race or sex, or the like. Some 
words no one should have to hear directed at them, especially 
when slurs undercut the rights of legally protected groups at 
work or on social media and some might argue, even on a picket 
line. That said, what should the consequences be for various lev-
els of misconduct in these instances? There is a big difference 
between calling an employee a “boomer,” which term admittedly 
refers to an ageist stereotype, as opposed to using offensive rac-
ist or degrading sexual terms to refer to other employees. 
 What should the NLRB have done regarding the per-
ceived conflict between federal workplace statutes, the NLRA, 
and equal employment opportunity laws? The setting-specific 
standards the Board was using were clearly workable and well 
known in the human resource and labor law spheres.346 As long 
as employers, as well as the Board and its ALJ’s, reference vio-
lations of equal employment opportunity as misconduct and 
treat it accordingly, and not in a discriminatory fashion that pe-
nalizes those who were engaged in protected concerted activity, 
the previous NLRB rules produced little or no conflict with EEO 
rights.347 The NLRB is entitled to deference in interpreting the 
application of the Act to changing industrial patterns. However, 
344 Provocation is a factor in both criminal and civil actions, which works 
to mitigate the consequences of assault by the defendant. The NLRB did not 
originate this concept in Atlantic Steel but they did place it in a workplace 
context under the NLRA. 
345 See Seven Dirty Words, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Seven 
_dirty_words [https://perma.cc/89F6-R96W].  
346 Gen. Motors III, 369 N.L.R.B. No. 127, slip op. at 5 (July 21, 2020). 
347 Id.
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to overturn sound precedent, and for the appellate courts to en-
force such orders, the Board must outline rationale for such that 
is not arbitrary and capricious. The three Republican appointees 
to the Board, in deciding the General Motors case, took it upon 
themselves to overrule much sound precedent without adequate 
justification.348 To quote former Board Chair Wilma Liebman, 
dissenting in the IBM Corp. case, the majority changed the rule 
“not because they must, and not because they should, but be-
cause they can.” 349 This decision reflects the reality of partisan 
politics with unnecessary flip-flopping on standards every time 
the political composition of the Board sways.350 There is no dis-
sent in the GM case because the then three-member Board was 
all on the employer’s side. The GM Board prides itself with ad-
vancing civility in the workplace, but that is not the role of the 
NLRB. That is not even the role of the EEOC.351
 The bottom line for enforceability of NLRB orders in fed-
eral courts should be whether the Board attributed enough 
weight to misconduct that clearly violates equal employment op-
portunity laws when determining if the misconduct exceeds the 
protection of the Act. Misconduct that violates equal employment 
opportunity laws should have more severe consequences than pro-
fanity that is the equivalent of toilet or bathroom talk. At the 
same time, minor violations of civility rules that impinge upon equal 
employment opportunity amongst coworkers should be sanctioned 
in accordance with their severity. Standards for progressive disci-
pline should be transparent and imposed in a nondiscriminatory 
manner. The right of employees to engage in concerted activities, 
including picketing for higher wages and better working conditions, 
and employee rights to be free from racial and sexual harassment, 
among others, must be balanced equitably in order for the im-
portant public policies behind the federal labor and employment 
348 Lynn Rhinehart and Celine McNicholas, Three Republican-appointed 
white men are now deciding whether you have rights on the job, ECON. POL, INST.
(Dec. 17, 2019, 2:55 PM), https://www.epi.org/blog/three-republican-appointed 
-white-men-are-now-deciding-whether-you-have-rights-on-the-job/ [https:// 
perma.cc/VN8S-KM3F]. 
349 IBM Corp., 341 N.L.R.B. 1288, at 1311 (2004) (Liebman, J., dissenting). 
350 See supra text accompanying notes 281–84.  
351 Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Serv., 523 U.S. 75, 75 (1998) (noting Title 
VII is not a general civility code for the American workplace). 
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law statutes to be effectuated.352 As opponents to the NLRB’s 
prior stance on this matter have noted, the NLRB should not act 
with blinders on regarding other statutes that may conflict with 
its rules.353 Just as arbitrators have been required to interpret 
equal employment laws within labor disputes,354 so too should 
the NLRB read the NLRA in a broader context to prevent labor 
law from infringing upon equal employment opportunity laws. 
352 See generally Interfering with employee rights (Section 7 & 8(a)(1)), NLRB, 
https://www.nlrb.gov/about-nlrb/rights-we-protect/the-law/interfering-with-em 
ployee-rights-section-7-8a1 [https://perma.cc/MZ3A-8AHG]. 
353 Gen. Motors III, 369 N.L.R.B. No. 127, slip op. at 2 (July 21, 2020). 
354 See supra note 342 and accompanying text. 
